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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Purpose of the Thesis. 
This thesis has as its primary purpose the exposition 
of Hegel's pi:Iilosophy of religion as set forth in the three-
... 
volume work entitled Lectures on the Philosophy of' Religion. 
The first German edition of these lectures was published at 
Berlin in 1832, the year after Hegel's death, and was the 
earliest installment of' the collected edition of his printed 
and unprinted works, undertaken by a number of his friends. 
The book was rather hastily put together, mainly from stu-
dental copies of' lectures on the subject delivered during 
-different sessions, though it also contained matter taken 
from notes and outlines in Hegel 1 s own handwriting. A 
second edition, in an enlarged and very much altered form, 
appeared in 1840. In the preparation of' this second edition, 
the editor, Marheineke, drew largely on several important 
papers found amongst Hegelts manuscripts, in which his ideas 
·-
were developed in much greater detail than in any of the 
sketches previously used; and he had also at his disposal 
fresh and very complete copies of the lectures made by some o:t: 
Regel's most distinguished pupils. 
-
Due to the organic nature of Hegel's thought, an adequate 
understanding of any single aspect of his system involves, 
2. 
to a degree at least~ some knowledge of' the rest of his 
syste.m. Beari~ this in mind, it will become a secondary 
purpose of this thesis to set Hegel's reflections on religion 
in their proper place ~thin his total system, with special 
attention to the particular sphere in which religion appears--
the sphere of Absolute Mind. 
B. The Plan of the Thesis 
In fulfilling the two purposes which have been set the 
following plan has been adopted. Chapter II will include a 
birdts-eye view of' the major divisions of Hegel's system 
-
based upon the outline presented in his Encyclopaedia of' the 
Philosophical Sciences. In addition, the second chapter will 
also include a brief treatment of .Art-the first stage of 
Absolute Mind in Hegelts scheme. Chapters III through VI will 
-
contain as concise an exposition of his philosophy of religion, 
both in its broad outlines and significant details, as is in 
keeping w:t th the general nature and purpose of' this study. 
Chapter VII will deal in summary fashion with Philosophy, the 
third and final stage of' .Absolute Mind. In the f'inal chapter, 
Chapter VIII, specific criticisms to which Hegel's philosophy 
of' religion falls heir will be suggested, in addition to wnich, 
an attempt will be made to point ouP the significant insights 
of' permanent value which Hegel has given us; the chapter will 
be critical-evaluative in character. 
It is hoped that the primary purpose of this thesis, i.e., 
the exposition of Hegel's philosophy of religion, will be ful-
-
-
--
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filled by the d~scussion set forth in Chapters III through 
VI and Chapter VIII, and the secondary purpose of seeing the 
place of religion within Hegel's total system will be ful-
filled by our summary treatment of' Art and Philosophy in 
Chapters II and VII. 
G. Sources 
The principaa work upon which this thesis is based is 
Hegel 1 s three-volume t~eatise, entitled Lectures on the 
.. 
Philosophy of Religion. The chapters on art and philosophy 
involved recourse to his extensive lectures in those res.pec-
ti ve subjects, Lectures on the Philosophy o:f Fine Art and 
Lectures on the History of' Philosophy. Hegelts Phenomenology 
of Mind was especially useful and, in addition_, the Logic, 
translated :from the Encyclm~dia of the Philosophical Sciences. 
On the secondary level, Wallace's Prolegomena to the Study 
-
o:f Hegel was :found helpful as a general introduction to what 
Hegel is all about. Of the same type and also· useful as an 
introduction to Hegelrs system is The Origin and Significance 
. .-
of Hegelrs Logic by J. B. Baillie. W. T. Stace in The 
-Philosophy of Hegel has attempted the herculean task of 
offering a complete exposition of the system of Hegel in 
a single volume. Although his interpretation of the whole 
or of parts has been challenged, he nevertheless succeeds 
in presenting ~ a reasonably clear and lucid manner what 
4. 
at first glance often seems to be some very ndarku sayings. 
His usefulness has consisted in his ability to illumine 
these difficult places. Then too~ we should not forget 
Royce 1 s admirable treatment of Hegel in The Spirit of 
Modern Philosophy. This treatment 1 though brief in compass 1 
is always to the point. The last book and the only book 
dealing expressly with Hegel 1 s religious views is James 
Macbride Sterrettts Studies in Hegelts Philosophy of 
Religion. This book, promising though the title is, was 
not as useful as one could have wished. The author attempts 
to make Hegel the spokesman of the orthodox Anglicanism of 
fifty years ago. He has,_nevertheless, been helpful at 
points and any indebtedness to him is acknowledged at the 
appropriate places. 
The inspiration for this thesis grew out of a full-
year Seminar in Hegel offered at Boston University in the 
year 1956-57 under the direction of Professor John H. Lavely • 
.. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN HEGEL t S SYSTEM 
A. The Main Divisions of Hegelts System.l 
It will be helpful at ~he very outset to understand 
the place of religion in Hegelts system. It may be 
~ 
graphically schematized as follows: 
The Idea in itself, or 
The LOGICAL IDEA 
The IDEA The Idea outside itself, or (allreali tyJ NATURE 
The Idea in and 
for itself, or 
PIRIT . 
Subjective 
Spirit 
Objective 
Spirit 
Absolute 
pirit 
:Art 
f:eligion in general Religion efinite religion bsolute religion (Christianity) 
Philosophy 
lThis division is based upon Hegel's division as set 
forth in the Encyclopaedia o:r the Philosophical Sciences. 
6. 
The all-inclusive conception in Hegel's philosophical 
system is the Absolute Idea, often ~efe~red to briefly as 
the Absolute, or the Idea. The Absolute Idea includes, or 
rather is, all reality o~ the uni~rse. For Hegel, reason, 
thought, the Idea, is knowable by human minds; for the 
structure of the world is harmonious with our minds which 
are organic parts of it; so it is well to call ultimate 
reality the Absolute Idea. This Absolute Idea is Spirit-
the world soul-which thinks and is the catego~ies, and 
which religion in a figurative way ~egards as:God. 
The Absolute Idea passes through a dialectic of many 
triads,--each of which has its own thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis. In the thesis a certain aspect of ~ea.lity is 
revealed, in the antithesis a cont~asting aspect appears, 
and the two are th~n aufgehoben in a higher synthesis. 
The most general triad has Logic as thesis, Nature as anti~ 
thesis and Mind or Spirit (as Geist is vv:-iously translated) 
--
as synthesis. Regel understands by what he calls dialectic 
(l) a property of all our thoughts, by vi~tue of which each 
particular thought necessarily passes over into another, 
' but also (2) a prope~ty of things by virtue of which every 
particular thing necessarily belongs together with all 
other things. Hence, in his view, the way in which thought 
reaChes truth is also the immediate exp~ession of the inner-
most life of eXistence. In a very real sense, according to 
Hegel, when we think existence, existence thinks in us. 
--- -~-
7. 
In the first place, then, since every concept is 
limited, it passes over When logically thought out into 
its opposite or, as Hegel calls it, its negation. To 
think it out is to annul it. But through the negation 
there arises a new positive concept; :for what is negated 
is only the :finite content, not all content whatsoever. 
Negation, then, means a new concept comes into force. 
But since this new concept is determined by its relation 
to the previous one, it is richer than the latter. The 
concept which is now :formed contains the preceding one 
taken up into a larger whole. Further, negation is 
only an annulling in the sense that the negated concept 
is raised to a higher unity. A unity o:f opposites, (an 
immensely important notion for Hegel) comes into being 
which contains both the concept positive and its opposite. 
But by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency 
outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation 
of the predicates o:f understanding is seen in its 
true light, arid shown to be the negation o:f them. 
For anything to be finite is just to suppress itself 
and put itself aside. Thus understood the Dialectical 
~inciple constitutes the life and soul of scientific 
progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent 
connexion and necessity to the body of science; and, 
in a word.; is seen to eons ti tute the real and the 
true, as opposed to the external, exaltation above 
the finite.l 
Secondly, this forward-striving dialectic is the 
exp~ess~Qn of the self-development of existence. Every 
finite phenomenon points, by virtue of its limitation, 
1G. W. F. Hegel, llhe Logic of Hegel, tr. by William 
Wallace (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1892), p. 147. 
s. 
beyond itself; it is but a moment in the one great whole. 
In maintaining the objectivity of the dialectic Hegel has 
two rarticular experiences in view, as may be seen by his 
application of it in detail. These are, first, the passing 
over of' opposites in to one anotheJJ, precisely because of 
their oppositional relation, e.g., the psychological effect 
of contrast, the rhythm of life and death, light and darkness 
(for too strong a light as well as absolute darkness deprives 
one of the power of seeing), et. cetera~; At the highest 
point of evolution or development, dissolution sets in: 
this was the law according to which Hegel attempted to 
construct his philosophy of na. ture and o:f history. 
Secondl·y, however~ and this is the essential point of 
view- he is mindful of the fact that the results of earlier 
stages of' development determine development in its later 
stages. The seed-corn must perish if' the plant is to come 
into being, but the plant contains all that was of the 
essence of the seed-com. What Hegel tries to express by 
his doctrine of the dialectic as a world-process is his 
~viction of the conservation of the forces and values 
in existence. 
Logic, for Hegel is tbe Absolute Idea in itself, be-
fore it becomes external nature. Here, it must be remem-
bered, ttbef'ore" refers to logical priority only,; Hegel 
. - . 
does not mean that once upon a time the Absolute Idea 
existed only as the categories of the Logic and that it 
subsequently externalized itself' in nature • 
. -~,.;..- ···-
In anti thesis to Logic, in which the Absolute is pure 
.·thought, stands Nature in which the Absolute Spirit exter-
nalizes itself as the outer world. Hegel's purpose in his 
Philosophy of Nature is to show what universal conceptions 
underlie nature. 
The third.part or Hegel 1 s.system, the Philosophy of 
Mind, deals with the cultural experiences or mankind. The 
thesis of the principal triad, Subjective Mind, treats of 
psychology, the mental ~ocesses of individuals considered 
by themselves abstractly, apart from society. The anti-
thesis to this is Objective Mind, in which the mind of man 
is found to gain freedom, concreteness, and objectivity 
in social relationships. Finally, in the synthesis of the 
triad, Absolute Mind, man becomes concretely conscious of 
himself as well as of the material and social world in which 
he lives, and through Art, Religion, and Philosophy he 
comes to appreciate his divine origin and destiny, as a 
manifestation of the Absolute Idea. 
Hegelts main objection to the phase of Subjective Mind 
.. 
is its mere inwardness and hence its one-sidedness. Objective 
Mind, on the other hand, exhibits the opposite one-sidedness. 
It is merely outward and objective, and has lost wb.a t is 
essential to the very no~ion of spirit, namely, consciousness 
or subjectivity. Subjective mind and Objective mind exist, 
therefore, as two-opposite extremes. It is the task of 
Absolute Mdnd to bridge the gap between objectivity and sub-
10. 
jectivity in such a way as to embrace both sides in a con~ 
crete unity. In Short, Absolute Spirit must be both subject 
and object at the same .. time. As Stace points out in his 
study of the philosophy of Hegel: 
The stage of absolute spirit, therefore, is only 
reached when the mind realizes that whatever is 
opposed to it as an object, the sun, moon, stars, 
the entire physical and non-physical universe, is 
nothing other than spirit itself; when it realizes· 
that it itself is all being and all reality, that 
it is, in fact., the Absolute. Absolute spirit is 
that final phase in which the spirit knows that in 
oontemplating itself it is contemplating the Absolute. 
He goes on to say that 
since such absolute spirit only exists as subjective 
human consciousness, it may further be said that 
absolute spirit is the knowledge, by human beings, 
of the Absolute. All the modes under which human 
beings, can be conscious of the Absolute, whether 
in art, relilion, or philosophy, are phases of abso-
lute spirit. 
One must be careful not to draw from Stace 1 s statement 
an erroneous conclusion. For Regel the Absolute is not 
.. . 
exhausted in subjective human consciousness. 
Absolute Spirit, then, has for its content the appre-
hension of' the Absolute. Hegel maintains that this appre-
hension of' the Absolute takes place under three modes., 
which give us the three stages of' Absolute Spirit, viz. (1) 
art, (2) religion., and (3) philosophy. From this it can 
be easily seen that all tbr ee are alike in substance but 
different in form.. They all aim at the apprehension o:f 
lw. T! st~ce, The Philosoaht of' Hegelrf (New York: 
Dover. PublJ..catJ..ons, .1923)., p. 4 • . · ~.:: . 
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absolute truth, their content--the eternal, infinite, and 
divine, in a word, the Absolute-is the same.. They differ, 
however, inasmuch as the f'orm in which the absolute truth 
is presented to consciousness, is in each case different. 
Since the content of all three is the same, it is to 
the f'orm that their relative superiority or ·inferiority 
attaches. Religion contains the same fundamental truth as 
philosophy, but expressed in an inferior form. Art, then, 
as the f'irst phase, is the least adequate form in which the 
eternal is apprehended. While art is the least adequate 
form in which the Absolute is apprehended, it is, neverthe-
less, integral to the development of Religion as antithesis 
and Philosophy as synthesis. It is to this phase that we 
shall direct our attention f'or the remainder of' this chapter. 
B. The Sphere of' Art. 
In his discussion of the general significance of the 
notion of the beautiful, Hegel writes, nwe have defined 
beauty to ~e the Idea of the beautiful.u1 From this it 
follows that beauty and truth are, in one aspect of them, 
identical. In other words, while truth is not the defining 
characteristic of the beautiful, beauty must itself in its 
intrinsic being be true~ Approaching this from the other 
side Hegel writes that ttthe idea is not only true, but is 
also beautiful. The beautiful may therefore be defined as 
the sensuous semblance of' the Idea. tt2 
lHegel, G. F. W., Lectures on the Philosophy of Fine Art. 
Trans. F. B. S. Osmaston. 4 Vols. (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 
1920), I, 147. 
2rb:id .. , I, 154. 
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Accordtng to Hegel's scheme, the Absolute is first 
apprehended in immediacy, that is under the guise o:f external 
sense objects. It is essential to the beautiful that it be 
embodied in something sensuous-an actual thing present to the 
senses. But this is not all, for a mere sensuous existence> 
as such, is not beautiful. It is necessary :for the mind to 
perceive the Idea shining through the object. Hegel calls the 
. 
Idea as sensuously manifested the Ideal. In reference to the 
original definition o:f beauty given, Hegel goes on to say: ~By 
-. 
this definition is implied that we have to conceive the beauti-
~ul as Idea, and, moreover, as Idea in a determinate shape, 
as Ideai. ul 
In answer to the question, how can the Idea, or the_ 
absolute, manifest itself in a sensuous object, we have to 
_return to the Logic. Here the Notion, "Which is not yet Idea, 
. . 
is subjectivity, but the Idea is the unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity. Now, Hegel contends, in an art object you have 
a unity in multiplicity. An art object is not simply an aggregate 
of disconnected parts like random leaves on the ground. Rather, 
it is an organization in which the factor o:f unity is the side 
of subjectivity while the :factor o:f multiplicity or plurality 
is the side o:f objectivity. Such an object, therefore, be-
cause it manifests the Idea in objective and sensuous :form, 
is beautiful. 
13. 
The most element~y form of existence, which the 
Idea takes to itself is Nature, and the first form of 
beauty is that of Nature. From the Log~c we discover that 
Nat'll'l:"e is the Idea in its otherness. Since in Nature the 
Idea is manifested in sensuous externality, Nature is beautiful. 
But there are degrees of beauty in Nature. At its lower 
extreme, crass matter, the Idea is so completely absorbed 
as to be practically invisible. In fact, Hegel writes that 
dead or inorganic nature is not adequate to express the Idea; 
l 
only tbe organic life of nature unfolds its reality. uLife 
-is, -n Hegel tells us, 11 the first genuine apt:e arance of the Idea 
~ . 2 
in Nature.n The beauty of nature is inferior to the beauty 
of art in the same degree as nature in general is inferior to 
spirit. One might well agree with Stace3 who shares the 
opinion of some critics that Hegel is :far too cursory in his 
discussion of beauty in nature and assigns to it too low a 
place. 
Leaving nature, then, we come to the study of the 
beauty of art. liegel i:osists tb.a t every W>rk of art has 
..-._two sides which are bound together in unity. First of all, 
there is the side of unity. This is the unity of the 
Notion before it has issued forth into plurality and object-
ivity. The Notion is subjectivity. Rere, then, we are 
~Ibid., :r, 163. 
2' Ibid.' I, l.64. 
3stace, The PhilosoJ2h:l of Regel, p. 446. 
. 
'-. 
' 
. 
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concerned w1 th the content o.f the art w:>rk. The other 
side manifests itself in the plurality of differences. 
This is the objective, sensuous, material side of a work 
of art. This simply means its material embodiment or f'orm. 
Now to sum up we may say with Stace, nBeauty is the vision 
of the Absolute shining through a_ sensuous medium. The 
Absolute which thus shines through is the spiritual content. 
The sensuous medium through which it shines is the material 
embodiment.nl 
The ideal work of art would be one in which the 
two sides, content and form, are in perfect accord and 
union, so that the embodiment constitutes the full and 
complete expression of the content, whereas the content, 
on its part, could find no other than this very embodiment, 
as adequate expression for it. But this ideal is not 
always attained. Any failure to achieve perfect accord be-
tween form and content results in one of three possible 
relationships. These three possible relationships give 
us the three fundamental types of art. {l) When matter 
(embodiment) is predominant over spirit (form) we have 
art which is best described as symbolic. ( -2) illb..s:lacmtexce~ 
ment of a perfect balance between form and content results · 
in classical art. (3) Romantic art is the outcome of 
the supremacy of the formal content side over the material 
lstace, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 451 • 
15. 
embodiment side. 
While the development here indicated is principally 
a logical one, Hegel does point out that the actual evo-
lution of art in the world has to a large extent followed 
the notional development. In line with this Hegel makes 
three observations none of which he says are to be pressed: 
{1). He points out that the earliest art is for the most part 
symbolic; this was fo11owed by the classical period of art, 
and, finally, most modern art, Hegel observes, is romantic. 
(2) The different types of art are associated with different 
peoples. The art of the Hindus and the Egyptians, Oriental 
art is predominantly symbolic. Grecian Art was classical 
while·that of moder.n Europe is romantic. And finally, (3) 
Hegel observes that the three types are associated with 
specif'ic arts. Architecture is the chief symbolic art, 
sculpture the classical, painting, music and poetry, the 
romantic. All of' these observations he would sa:y are not to 
be rigidly bald. He admits that symbolic, classical and 
ro~antic art is f'ound in all periods and in all places to 
some extent and he does not minimize the importance of class-
ical and romantic architecture •. Now we shall turn to a. 
brief examination of' these three types of art. 
1. The Symbo lie Type of' .Art. 
In this type of' art the Idea would fain clothe itself . 
. 
with fonn and yet it is unable to secure in the substant~~l 
16. 
appearances of the world a definite form which is entirely 
adequate to express ~e abstractness and universality of 
its longing. In i:h.is connection., Hegel defines a symbol 
as "some form. of' external .existence· immediately presented 
-
to the senses., which., however, is not accepted for its 
own worth, as it lies thus before us in its immediacy., 
but for the wider and more general significance which it 
offers to our reflection.ul When we sa:y that a lion sym-
.. 
bolizes strength or a fox symbolizes cunning it is not the 
concrete thing itself which we desire to bring before the 
imagination but simply that general quality of significance 
which attaches to it. We can conclude from all this that 
the use of the term symbol is necessarily and essentially 
open to ambiguity. 
This ambiguity is clearly seen when we attempt to 
understand a w:>rk of' symbolic art. What a symbol pri-
marily offers us is generally speaking a fo1-m, an image, 
which of itself is the presentment of an immediate fact. 
Such illlDilllediate existence., or its image., fue lion:,or the 
fox for example, stands there before us as it is, an 
existing fact. The questions consequently arises whether 
a lion, 'Vib.os e image is set before us, merely is set there 
to express the natural fact., or whether in addition to 
this it carries a further significance, that is the more 
abstract connotation of mere strength or c~ing; whether 
l.Hegel, iG@cture.s on ·The Philosophy of Fine Art, 1: · 
II, 8-• 
• 
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in fact, as we say, the image is to be taken literally, 
or with a further ideal significance. This ambiguity 
explains the sense o.f mystery ~ich pervades all symbolic 
art, especially that of Egypt. The essential defect through-
out all. symbolic art is the incongruity between content 
and embodiment, whereby the content never truly gets itself 
expressed, but is onl.y hinted at and suggested by means 
of symbols. It is this defect 'Which .forces art onwards 
-
to another type, the classical type of art. 
2. The Classical Type of Art. 
Inasmuch as art is the apprehension o.f the Absolute, 
and the Absolute is spirit, it follows that in art spirit 
.. 
apprehends itself. But spirit in symbolic art, as aeen 
in the side o.f content, is revealed· only as abstract. For 
example, in Hindu art the Absolute is envisaged as the 
.formless One. This .formless One is such that its very 
nature is to reject the sensuous, to refuse all combination 
with it. The Greeks, however, considered the divine beings 
personal and individual beings like ourselves. Stace 
suwmarizes the Greek advance this way: "The task which art 
sets before itself is to know the Absolute in its truUh, 
and this can only mean to know it as spirit. Now when 
spirit comes to know the Absolute, not as empty being, but 
as spirit, what it learns is that the Absolute is itselr.ul 
lstace, The Philosophz o.f Hegel, p. 459 .. 
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Hence anthropomorphism becomes the dominant note, and the 
Absolute is conceived under the mode of human ~ndividuality. 
The content is now no longer a formless abstraction 
but formed individuality Vlhich readily combines with sen-
suous embodiment. ttThe :ronn,n Hegel writes, 
~ -
is essentially the human form because the external-
ity of this fo:rm. is alone capable of revealing the 
sp~itual in sensuous guise. Human expression in 
countenance, eye, pose, and carriage is, it is true, 
material and therein not that which the spirit is; 
but within this corporeal f'ra.nie itself' the human 
exterior is not merely alive and a part of Nature 
as the animal is, but it is the bodily pre sense 
which reflects Spirit to i-tself .1 
From this it follows that sculpture is the classical art 
~ excellence. 
The cl:t.ief defect in the classical type of art is the 
fact that the conception of the divine mich it embodies 
is defectivee It is of ~e ver,r nature of spirit to be 
infinite and free. But ~e Greek gods are neither free 
nor infinite. As a plurality they are limited by one another. 
Then, too, they are subject to the necessary course of things; 
inexorable fate stands above them. 
3. The Roman tic Type of Art. 
Hegel regards classical art in one s:anse as the 
highest type of art and in another sense he takes romantic 
art iD be the highest.. Since form and content achieve 
a balance in classical art, classical art alone must be 
lHegel, Lectures on The Philosophy of Fine Art, II, 177. 
19. 
considered the highest form. But from the standpoint of' 
spirit romantic art is the highest. In romantic art spirit 
more clearly grasps its own true nature. But it should 
be pointed out that in so far as romantic art departs from 
and transcends the perfect type of' art it to that extent 
transcends the limits of art altogether and is embarked 
upon a transitional stage to the higher sphere of reli-
gion. 
As a ma. tter of fact1 as we pointed out in the intro-
duction, there is no sensuous embodiment which is truly 
adequate to spirit. It is in pure thought alone, in phil-
osophy, that Spirit finds an expressive medium adequate 
for itself. The inward life of the soul is the essential 
subject matter of ~omantic art. 
In the last part of his Philosophy of Fine .Art, Hegel 
passes to a discussion of the particular arts. For Hegel, 
art cannot remain as the Idea but must pass into some 
externally sensuous f'orm. The oontent of' art remains 
forever the same, i.e, the Idea or Absolute Spirit, there-
fore, what changes from one particular art to another is 
the sensuous medium employed. Hegel classifies the arts 
according 1D the diff'erent ma. teriaJ. media through which 
the Idea expresses itself. 
We can observe the same progression among the several 
arts which existed among the general types of art. In 
symbolic art matter triumphed over spirite In classical 
art matter and .form stood on a level and in romantic art 
spirit predominated. Exactly the same principle is opera-
tive among the individual arts. In architecture the 
material aspect is supreme; solids in three dimensions 
.furnish the :medium. The highest art-poetry-stands at 
the other end of the scale. Poetry is the highest because 
the material aspect is negligible consisting of words and 
sounds whereas the sensuous images created are purely in-
ward atd subjective. Architecture is .fundamentally sym-
bolic. Sculpture is the chief classical art whereas pai~t­
ing, music and poetry are romantic. 
RoJ.Utmtic art carries within itself the seeds of its 
own destruction. The principle of romantic art is that, 
because the Absolute is spirit, it can only be known as 
spirit, and no sensuous .form is adequate to it; but, on 
the other hand, the very notion of art involves the appre-
hension o.f the Absolute, not as spirit, but as sense-object. 
Art, therefore, is inadequate and self-contradictory. Since 
the essence of the Idea is thought or the universal 7 any 
adequate apprehension of the Absolute will involve its 
being cognized as thought instead of sense-object. But 
the jump,; from the apprehension of the Absolute in sen-
suous embodiment (art) to its apprehension as pure thought 
(philosophy) is not a single one. It involves a middle step 
---religion--in which the Absolute is neither cognized in 
a purely sensuous wey or a purely rational wey. And 
so art by its very inadequacy and self-contradictory 
character leads to the higher stage--religion. Hegel 
writes that 
21. 
inasmuch as art is preceded in Nature and the finite 
processes of lif'e by a kind of' antenatal hisotry, so too 
there is a history that f'ollows its culmination, which 
in other terms passes over and beyond its purely conceptive 
or plastic grasp of' the Infinite. For art carries in 
the notion that gives it.life a limit; and it is from 
this boundary that the human consciousness passes beyond 
into forms more adequate to its spiritual import. It 
is this inherent shortness of the mark that f'ixes the 
subordinate position we are only too ready to assign to 
art in our daily life nowadays.l 
Hegel tells us that among the Greeks ~t was the highest 
medium under which the community conceived fts gods, and be-
came conscious of' truth. For this reason we may justly say 
that the poets and the artists of Greece created the gods of' 
their people. In Hegel 1 s ViO rds, "they defined :for the imagina-
tion of their people the active life and energy of' the Divine 
Presence, giving them the definite content of' a religion.n2 
.. 
But, Hegel continues, flthere is a period in the education 
of' every civilized nation, when art becomes a sign-post, as it 
were, to that which stands beyond her:,border._tt3 He feel.s that 
the earliest beginnings of' art exhibit a straining which persists 
because artrs imaginative powers are unable to envisage to sense 
libid., I, 141 .. 
2J:bid., I, 140 .. 
. 3:i:bid., I, 141. 
~---
the complete truth o~ its content with perfect outward shape 
in art, it is driven inevitably away from this objective 
realization to its own free spiritual activity as from something 
repellent to it. Art in its specific form has ceased to meet 
the highest requirements of spiritual life. 
We may still wander at the unrivalled excellence of the 
statues of the gods of Hellas, and imagine that God the 
Father, Christ, and the Virgin Mary have received ideal 
representation at the hands of more recent painters. But 
it is no use. Our knees no longer bow to them.l 
Art, then, passes over into religion. The form which 
belongs to the religious consciousness is that of Vorstellung 
i.e., picture thought, imaginative concept or ordinary thought 
as it has been variously translated. tiThe Absolute is here 
removed from the externality of artistic production,u Hegel 
tells us, uand is received in a more spiritual way by the 
imagination, so that the heart and emotions, the inner life 
of the individual that is to say, becomes its vehicle.n2 In 
other words, when a work of art objectifies the truth for 
sense perception, and apprehends this form of the Absolute as 
the appropriate one to its vision, ''religion blends with the 
.. 
same the devotional attitude that i'lows from the inner life 
comfronted with the absolute reality as thus presented.u3 
-
Devotion, Hegel continues, is a type of emotional experience 
which is, strictly speaking, outside the province of art. 
libid., I, 142. 
2ibid., I, 142. 
3ibid., I, 143. 
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The transition to religion is effected when the individual 
permits the object which art has rendered visible to sense to 
penetrate his emotional life, and so completely identify him-
self with it flthat this inward presence, which the imagination 
and the inherent might of feeling have rendered possible, 
becomes an essential phase in the manifestation of absolute 
1 
reality.n 
libid., I, 143. 
---. 
CHAPTER, III 
HEGEL'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
Hegel begins his Lectures on the Philosophy of Rel~ 
.ti?~I~with a lengthy Introduction to the general subject. 
He divides the Introduction~ characteristically~ into three 
parts. In the first part he attempts to give some account 
of the division of consciousness which gives rise to the 
peculi~ need which the philosophy of religion seeks to 
·satisfy. This is followed by a description of the relation 
of this science to both religion and philosophy as well as 
the principles of th~ religious consciousness which were 
prevalent in his day. Then, after a brief discussion of 
certain pertinent questions of a preliminary sort which 
forms the second part of the.Introduction, he passes directly 
to part three .in which he gives a general division of -t;>he 
whole subject for the purposes of systematic treatment. 
A. Hegelts Definition of Religion 
Before proceeding to a philosophical investigation of 
any area of our experience it is well to have clearly in 
mind the object of the study in which we a-re to be engagedo 
What is the object of the philosophy of religion for Hegel? 
Is it the same as our ordinary idea of religion? These 
are questions which must be settled before any advance can 
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be made in the philosophical understanding of religion. 
Due to the organic nature of Hegelrs thought, any answer 
to these questions requires at least a partial understand-
ing of Hegelrs conception of_the task of philosophy as 
well as his view of religion. 
As one might expect from so comprehensive a thinker, 
Hegelts p~ilosophy includes a theory of what philosophy 
itself is. Indeed, the execution of so vast a program as 
that of eliciting from every form of human experience its 
own peculiar contribution to a .revelation of tb.e nature 
of Reality involved a new view_ of tb.e nature and function 
of this sort of philosophizing. Philosophy is reflective. 
"Through the philosophers Reality reflects upon itself, 
takes stock, as it were, of itself and its achievements; 
becomes conscious of itself and its identity in all its 
diverse, and even conflicting, manifestations.••l For it 
to do so, the philosopher must throw his mind wide open 
to the whole realm of human experience. He must discern 
the spiritual forces underlying historical events. He 
must focus in himself ~he universal principles of Nature 
as revealed by science. He must grasp the essential 
nature of Beauty as embodied in works of art, and the 
essential nature of Right, or Law, as realized in the struc-
ture of society and in the actual conduct of law-abiding 
~. F. Alfred Hoernle, Idealism· as a· Philosophy$: 
(New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930), p. 219. -~. 
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citizens. The essential moment in Regelts conception o:f 
philosophy is his :firm grasp upon the concrete reality of' 
human institutions as facts rooted in the work of' sense, 
yet, in their proper nature, spiritual. 
As :for Regel t s view o:f religions, we are at the very 
outset introduced to such an exalted conception of' religion 
as to be worthy o:t immediate and universal admiration, a 
conception which is free from the distractions and pre-
occupations of the particular details of life and which 
offers a sense of permanence, repose, certainty, an ab-
sorbing of ·the v.i.ciss;tudes, the_ restlessness and the 
doubts o:f actual life. Religion3 for Hegel, is the gener:tc 
description of that phase o:f mind which has found rest 
in the fullness of attainment and is no longer a struggle, 
but a fruition. Indeed, religion is for our consciousness 
that regiofi in which all the enigmas of the world 
are solved, all the contradictions of deeper-reaching 
thought have their meaning unveiled, and where the 
voice of the heartts pain is silenced--the region of 
eternal truth, of eternal rest, of eternal peace. • •• 
All the various peoples feel that it is in the 
religious consciousness they possess truth, and they 
have always regarded religion as constituting their 
true dignity and the Sabbath of their life. llb.at-
ever· awakens in us doubt and f'ear, all sorrow,· all 
care, all the limited interests of.finite life, we 
leave behind on the.shores·of time; and as :from the 
highest peak of' a mountain, far away from all defi-
nite view of what is earthly, we look down calmly 
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on all the limitations of the landscape and of ~e 
world, so with the spiritual eye man, lifted out of the 
hard realities of ~is actual world, contemplates it 
as something having only the semblance of existence, 
which seen from this· pure region bathed in the beams 
of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its shades 
of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened into 
eternal rest. In this region of spirit flow the 
streams of forgetfulness from which Psyche drinks, and 
in which she drowns a.ll sorrow, while the dark things. 
of this life are softened away into a dream-like 
vision, and become transfigured until they are a · · · 
mere framework for the brightness of .the Eternal ••• • 
~uch is the general perception, sensations, conscious-
ness, or however we may·designate it, of religion. 
To consider, to examine, and to comprehend its nature 
is the object of the present lectures.l 
It is the task of philosophy to demonstrate the 
necessity of religion in and ~or itself, not to convince 
the irreligious of its claims. In human freedom what is. 
and what ought to be are tw<:> different things. It is 
quite possible through self-will, perversity or sheer 
inertness to let oneself drift to the standpoint of untruth. 
This is not to say that philosophical knowledge which 
clearly perceives the necessity of the religious standpoint 
and recognizes the nullity of its separa~ion cannot awaken 
religious desire within the heart of man. Religion is essen-
tial to a man and not accidental to hls nature.. UJ:ndeed, n 
says Hegel 
no man is so utterly ruined, so lost, and so bad, nor . 
can we regard any one as being so wretched that he has 
lG.W.F. Hegel,· Lectnres on the Phil.oso h. of Reli ion, 
trans~ E.B~ Speirs' and J' .B.·· Sanderson 3 vols.l Lbndon: 
Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Go. Ltd., 1895), I,l. 
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no religion whatever in him, even if it were only that 
he has the fear of it, or some-yearning after it, or 
a feeling of hatred towards it.l 
That Which is of wrimary concern, however, is the place 
of religion in the total theory of the universe and it is 
with this that philoso,hy occn»ies itself. 
B. The Position of the Philosophy of Religion 
Relative to Philosophy and Religion 
·Wb.en )fJhilosophy takes religion as its object, it 
might appear that they stand opposed to on~ another in 
terms of tba t wi tb. which each is concerned. Such is not 
. -
the case. A closer look reveals that the object and 
interest of philosophy is essentially the same as the object 
and interest of religion. In the opening paragraph o:f 
the Science of Logic, Hegel states that 
tbe objects of philosophy, it is true, are·upon the 
mole the same &s those of religion. In both the 
object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God 
and God only is the Truth. · Both in like manner go 
on to treat of the Finite worlds of Nature and the 
human Mind, with their relation to each other and to 
their truth in God.2 
In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel writes: 
In the case o:f art and still more in that of Religion, 
Philosophy bas in common a content composed entirely 
of universal objects; they constitute the mode in 
which the highest-Idea is esistent for the unphil-
osophical feeling, the perceiving and ~agining con-
libid..! I, 5. 
2G.W.F. Hegel, The Logic of' Regel, trgns. William 
Wallace {London: _Oxford University Press, 1873), p. 3. 
~ ·~ l 
consciousness. 
And again, flPhilosophy stands on the same basis as Re-
ligion and has the same object--the universal reason 
existing in and ror itselr.n2 The same thought is brought 
out in the Philosophy or Mind where we read that 
It is only by an insight into the value or these forms 
the forms of speculative thought that the true and 
needful conviction can be gained, that the content or 
religion and philosophy is the same,--leaving out, 
of course, the further details of external nature and 
finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. 
But religion is the truth for all men.3 
And in his Philosophy of Religion we read that nthe object 
of religion as well as of philosophy is Eternal Truth in 
its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explica-
tion of His nature.n4 
What they have in common is the fact that they are 
both religion. A distinction enters when we ask what 
kind of reiigion we find in each. Confusion on the manner 
in which both religion and philosophy occupy themselves 
with God has given rise to an alleged antagonism between· 
!G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Histor 
trans. F.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson 
& Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955)$ I, p. 61. 
2
zbid., I, 63 .. 
of Philo so h , 
London: Routledge 
3 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. William 
Wallace (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894}, p. 152. 
4Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, 19. 
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philosophy and religion. Accordingly, philosophy is looked 
upon as destroying the sacred character of re~igion and 
reducing it to the level of' human speculation. 
Hegel tells us that this antagonism is at least as old 
as the ancient Athenians who condemned Socrates to death 
and burned certain philosophical writings which were con-
sidered harmful th the youth of Athens.l Also reaching 
back into anti~uity is the riotion of the unity of' religion 
An ' lj and philosophy. a:ximanderr s IL t<ITt'f"" was also called 
\. 
.:n. 88ov• And later the neo-Pythagorea.ns and the neo-
Platonists-e:x:ch~ed the heathen gods of imagination f'or 
gods of' thought. 
A still greater union o:f Pl?-ilosophy and !"eligion 
was achieved in the Middle Ages. A knowledge which seeks 
to comprehend ail was looked upon as essential to the 
understanding of the faith. It was from philosophy that 
Anselm and Abelard received the ~petus to begin their 
vigorous propagation of' the faith.2 
Nevertheless, it would be well to look at the dis-
tinction between religion and p~ilosophy as it presents 
itself' in this unity of content. 
The ]>ttr]>ose of philosophy is to apprehend everything 
lzoid., I, 20. 
~--
2r:bid • ., I, 21 • 
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as Idea; the Idea, however, is the True 1n tho~ht 
and this is not the same as ordinary conception.1 In 
sense perception we have the object before us as a 
whole. When we begin to reflect we begin to distinguish 
,P>articular. properties, in short,. to resolve the unity 
into parts.2 Reflection separates the substance from its 
attributes in such a way that that in Which the two are 
one becomes a third which is not to be identified with 
either the object or its pro~erties. The True in thought, 
then, the Idea, must be conceived of as the unity of' 
the_ object and the_ properties of the object which were 
set, by reflection, in oppo~ition the one with the other, 
in accordance with the characteristics of' thought. And 
thus in the form of thought speculative philosophy 
achieves the unity of the difference.3 
Religion, on the other hand, represents the stage 
~ which the speculat~ve content generally is an ob-
ject of consciousness.4 It is not the consciousness 
of this or that truth in particular things but of ab-
solute truth in which all things are com~rehended and 
outside of which there is nothing at all. The essential 
libid., I, 21. 
--
2rbid., I, 21. 
- .. 
3Ibid., I, 22. 
4Ibid., I, 22. 
moment of' the Universally True is its self-determinateness 
whereby it exists on ·its own account in' and for itself. 
The end or determi~~tion of' :finite thiil.gS lies in an Other 
whereas the True has its end in itself. Trut~ is 
. . 
manifested in other spheres being determined by reference 
to an Other, but not the hig~est absolute truth which is 
determined in and for itsel:r.l 
Let us now turn to a discussion of the relation of 
the philosophy of religion to the system of philosophy. 
When we ask what a word ·signifies we are asking about 
two kinds of things which are muif~ally o:@posed. That 
which we are thinking about we call the end, the intention, 
the general thought o:f this or that. When, however, 
we inquire about the intrinsic character of V!hat we are 
thinking about, it is essentially the thought that is in 
it o:f which we wish to have an idea. Tb.e signification 
of' the idea of God involves the thought which is in it 
not sim~ly the idea of it which we already have. 
Hegel calls this deeper signification the Notion.2 
Hence, in the philosowhy of religion we are concerned 
with the Absolute, the Essential Reality, the Nature of 
God as grasped by thought while logical philosophy is 
concerned with the logical Idea o:f God as He is in Rim-
1 Ibid., I, 22. 
2Ibid., I. 24. 
33. 
self.~ But since God gives Himself objectively, it also 
behooves us to consider the m~er of His manifestations 
to us. ttrn the Philosophy of Religion we have thus the 
Absolute as object; not, however, merely in the form of 
thought, but also in the .form o.f its manifestation.IIS. 
· In the other parts o.f philosophy God enters as the 
result; here '*this End is made the Beginning, and becomes 
. 
our special Object, as the simply concrete Idea, with its 
infinite manifestations.tt3 
-From this Hegel passes to a consideration of tb.e 
relation o.f the philorophy o.f religion to positive re-
ligion. Positive or dogmatic religion is embodied in 
the Apostolic Sym.bolum., other creeds and sup:r>emely in the 
Old and New Testaments o.f the Bible. The Bible, however, is 
not a body o.f systematic divinity. It must be interpreted, 
systematized and ezplained according to principles Which 
are inherent in thought itself'. HThought explicitly con-
-
tains categories, principles, premises, w.hich must make 
their influence f'elt in the work o.f interpretation.tt4 
lrbid., I, 25. 
2Ibid., I, 24. 
3Ibid., I, 26. 
4Ibid., I, 28. 
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Thus it is. that reason has an important function in the 
definition of' dogma. 
In time a rationalistic theology appeared on the 
scene at f'irst limiting its activities to the exegesis of' 
the Scriptures.l This abstract metaphysic of" the understand-
ing annihilated the religious content and oompletely im-
poverished the Spirit and, in the end, degenerated into the 
baldest deism. Rationali&m was content with an otiose 
Deity, a First Gause who was an outcast from the universe. 
With the darkness of' rationalistic theology Regel will 
have no part. This theology of" Reason or, as it has other-
wise been called, the theology of" the Enlightenment cannot 
serve as the foundation upon which an adequate philosophy 
o:t religion is buil. t. Any similarity between this em.p!by 
rational theology and the philosophy of' religion is of a. 
superficial nature and is "merely an appearance of' re-
semblance which vanishes directly it is examined into.n2 
Indeed, for Hegel God is to be c6ncei ved of' as concrete 
fullness and the thinking explication of' this fullness is 
the special task of' the philosophy of' religion. 
The philosophy of' religion cannot stand in opposition 
to positive religion, f'or 
there cannot be two kinds of' reason and two kinds 
of' Spirit; there cannot be a Divine Spirit and a 
human, there cannot be a Divine reason and a human, 
which are absolutely different. Human reason-the 
. 
2Ibid., r:, 33. 
consciousness of onets being--is indeed reason; 
it is the divine in man, and Spirit, in so .fru:> as 
it is the Spirit o.f God, is not a spirit beyond the 
stars, beyond the world. On the contrary, God is 
pPesent, omnipresent, and exists as Spirit in all 
spirits ••• a The expression that God as reason 
rules the world, would be irrational i.f we did not 
assume that it has reference also to religion, and 
that the Divine Spirit works in the special character 
and .fo~ assumed by religion.l 
c. Tb.e Relation o.f the Philosophy of' Religion to 
The Current Principles of the Religious Consciousness 
Rage~ characterizes his own age as knowing everything 
about an infinite number of subjects but nothing at all 
of God.2 In .fact, it was considered the highest intelli-
gence to r~gard such knowledge as impossible.3 Even the 
theologians ba ve done everything possible to destroy a11 
that gives definition to religion. They have regarded 
dogmas and creeds as merely of historical interest and have 
thrust them into the background or have forgotten them 
altogether. In the religious world there has entered a 
widespread indif.ference towards what was formerly re-
garded as essential to the faith. Regel cites as examples 
of doctrines which have lost their importance the doctrines 
of the Trinity, the Resurrection, the Redemptive work of 
libid., I, 33. 
2Ibid., I, 35. 
3ibid., I, 36. 
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l 
ahrist and the miracles of both the Old and New Testaments. 
This attitude has come about largely as a result of 
treating the dogmas of the Christian faith historically. 2 
Theologians have become entangled in a network of triv-
ialities and the external controversies which have raged 
about them. They are regarded as convictions which others 
have entertained in tbe past but which have no claim 
upon our own spirits. The absolute origin of these doc-
trines out of the depths of spirit, their truth which 
tbey have for our spirits is by means of this historical 
detachment utterly suppressed and attention is directed 
to une council Which established the doctrine, what grounds 
were adv~ced and what opinion came to predominate. 
Such an attitude is the death of the spirit and is 
completely foreign to philosophy as well as religion.. Here 
spirit must be existentially concerned with the true content, 
with the knowledge of God Himself. 3 
lie gel stand opposed to the emptiness of the view-
point just considered and uncompromisingly insists that 
to know God is the highest of a11 aims.4 And yet this 
standpoint has an aspect which must be considered, ngmely, 
that God reveals Himself in an immediate way to m~ In 
1Ibid., I, 58-40. 
2Ibid., I, 40 .. 
Bibid., I, 41. 
4ibid., I, 42. 
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fact, it is held, that religion consists in just this 
immediate knowledge of' God. In the former view all ob-
jective deter~ateness converged in the inwardness of 
subjectivity and now is added the conviction that ~e 
consciousness of God is immediately bound up with the 
consciousness of' self. The religious content manifests 
1 tself' not simpl:y- to spirit but to my s~iri t. This 
immediate manifestation carries with it its own authority 
and any outside corroboration is irrelevant. The valid-
ity of all truth rests upon the immediate witness of the 
Spirit to my spiri t.l. 
Here, Hegel asserts, philosophy coincides with 
current popular opinion, for reason is precisely that part 
of the spirit in which God reveals Himself to man.2 Hegel 
does not, however, agree with the conclusion which is often 
drawn f'rom this that not only is the consciousness of 
God bound up with the consciousness of sel.f but that this 
immediate relation with God is the only possible one.3 The 
relation of immediacy is taken to exclude all mediateness 
whatsoever and since philosophy is mediated knowledge 
it is therefore only finite knowledge of that which is 
finite. 
As a result of' all this it is f'urther alleged that 
in religion the consciousness relates itself' to its 
content in such a manner that the consciousness and the 
content--God--are inseparableel Hence, religion is con-
cerned simply with our relation with God, that He is 
rather than what He is. The real point is f'elt to be the 
relation between the subjective consciousness on the one 
hand and God reco-gnized as Object on the other. 
Regel asserts that the real kernel of' this position 
is the philosophical Idea itself', only the Idea is liber-
ated by philosophy from the co~ines or immediate know-
ledge. God is Spirit, He is concr.ete and religion is 
concerned with ~e development of' the f'undamental conception 
of' Spirite If' you ask what Spirit is, Hegel answers that 
it is essentially self-manifestation, its nature is to be 
f'or Spirit. nspirit is only Spirit in so f'ar ~s it is f'or 
Spirit; ·this constitutes the conception or notion or Spirit 
itself'.n2 
D. Preliminary Questions 
Bef'ore Hegel turns to a consideration of' the con-
ception of' religion in detail he pauses brief'ly to con-
sider certain objections which have been urged against any 
1Ibid., I, 44. 
2i:bid., I, 46. 
39. 
possible philos0phy ~f ~eligionel 
First, is ~ational knowledge of religion possible? 
There ~e those who p~otest that religion is the gift 
of God and rest on a highe~ authority than reason. It 
would appear that religion and ~eason occupy different 
spheres in whict the latter is subordinate to the former. 
Religious doct~~ne s ~e to be believed, not questioned. 
SuCh a bifurcation of the human spirit into intellectual 
insight, on the one hand, and religious faith on the other, 
together with t e insistence that these two contradictory 
eJ.ements must s bsist together, side by side, Hegel .flatJ.y 
rejects. His wbrds on ~is point are perfectly clear. 
- I 
It is a false idea that these t\ro, .faith and free 
pbilosophihal investigation, can subsist quietly ~~~et~!ts~~~th i~e~~e1~~~e!~~~a:;~~n~~~m:i~!~~-
o.f positiVf religion can continue to exist, if rea-
son has convinced itself of the opposite.~ 
But if religion is real and rational cognition is 
an essential patt o:f man then they cannot be kept sep-
arate without Jing violence to the one or to the other. 
I Either the spirit so divided against itseJ.f must reject 
the demand o:f t~e intellect .feeling or else maintain an 
attitude o.f ind~.ffe~ence towards religion which ends 
ultimately in a heism. To peruse the former as the Romanists 
libid., I, 48. 
2Ibid. 1 I, 49. 
.--~~-
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do or the latter as the rationalists do is, according to 
Hegel, ~e ttcourse followed by shallow spirits.nl 
Others: positivists and agnostics, deny the reason 
any competency outside the comparatively restricted area 
of finite phenomena. Still others assert that conscious-
ness o:f God arises only in .feeling and is not open to 
rational scrutiny. If this is the case, says Hegel, 
then God is relegated to the region of aooiqental. sub-
jectivity and it is indeed a wonder that any objectivity 
should be ascribed to God at all.2 On such a view every 
man's God is simply the product of his own feelings and 
this may be understood psychologically or even physio-
logically. TWo cases in point present themselves in 
Bruno Bauerts and Ludwig Feuerbach's a-theistic and 
.. 
materialistic conception of religion. 
Through all these objections we are brought to 
the question as to how we know whether reason is competent 
to deai with religion. A criticism of the f'acul ty of 
knowledge is what is needed some objectors tell us. But 
when we ask how reason is to be examined we find that it 
must be rationally examined and here ve are presented with 
a demand which cancels itself'. Reason alone can examine 
reason, which in the very act of examination presupposes 
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what it tries to prove, its capacity and its rationality. 
Reason, for Hegel, is not only the organ of thought, 
it is also the object of thought as well. God is not 
revealed in anything foreign to thought.l In fact, He 
reveals Himself in thought and to thought. Renee, the 
philosophy of religion is simply the tracing of thought 
in the relation of finite spirits with tne Infinite Spirit. 
These are correlative, the one to the other; as earth can-
not be show.n without heaven, neither can the finite spirit 
apart from the Infinite Spirit and vice versa. 
E. The Division of the Subject 
Hegel concludes his Introduction by giving a general 
survey, a synopsis or a classification of the whole sub-
ject. The Notion (Begriff) as it unfolds itself is the 
' /'• 
one and only method in all science. 
In the first place, the notion or conception of re-
ligion will be considered in its universal aspect; 
then, secondly, in its particular form as the self-
dividing and seld-differentiating notion, that is, 
under the aspect of judgment, of limitation, of 
difference, and of finiteness; and thirdly, we shall 
consider the notion, which encloses itself within 
itself out of the particularity in which it is un-
equal to-itself, so that it arrives at equality with 
its form, and does away with its limitation.2 
In this movement the life of the Spirit manifests itself. 
l~., I, 53. 
2Ibid., I, 59. 
In each of the three moments specified above the same 
triadic rhythm reappears.. First the Notion in its uni-
versal aspect. 
··- 0 
l.. The General. Notion or Conception of Religion.l 
a) The Moment of Uni versali ty2 
In this moment of complete universality 
thought thinks itself. It represents a moving up f'rom 
all finite particularity in order to view the Universal. 
But this Universal is not empty; it is pregnant with all 
distinctions not as actually present but as potentially 
existent. 
b) The Moment of Particul.arity3 
Here the Universal Idea moves on to self-specif'i-
cation in the subjective consciousness of' the individual. 
This issues in a tension between the finite thinker on 
the one hand and Universal. thought on the other. These two 
extremes are related in different individuals or in the 
same individual at different times in the forms of Feeling, 
Sense-perception or Idea.4 Renee, the content of religion 
may be either felt, imagined or thought. 
libid., I, 61. 
2Ib:td., I, 6l. 
3Ibid., I, 63. 
4:ffere th~ German word is Vorstellun.g, not Beg;:iff, 
and is. translated by Speirs and Sanderson as ordinary 
thought. 
c) The Annul~ing o:f the Diff'erentiation, 
or Worship . 
The essence of "'l'D l?Ship or cultus manifests itself' 
as a relation between God and man. This re~ationship 
is at :f.'irst one of :rear towards an unoontro~hb~e and 
arbitrary power.. Man :reels his re~ationship with God 
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to be accidental, transient and vanishing. This relation-
ship between God and man is overcome in the recognition 
that the absolute substance is at the same time ~ essence. 
Now WDrship is just this--the process of.' overcoming the dua~­
ism between our own conscio~sness and the a.bso~ute Spirit. 
11The specific characteristics o:f content in the two sides 
- . 
are consequently not different in themselves, but only 
in tneir form. The abso~ute object therefore determines 
itself for consciousness as totality which is in unity With 
itsel.r.u2 
2. Positive (pre-Christian) Religions. 3 
The different :forms of ex.ist:tng religions are moments 
of religion in general.4 They have an independency too, 
since religion has developed in time and therefore has 
a history. Hege~ performed a great service in pointing 
out a truth that is now almost universa1~y accepted, 
lHege~, Phi~osophy o:f Re~igion, I, 65. 
2l:bid., I, 71. 
3" Ibid., I, 73. 
. 4rbid., I, 76. 
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namely, that all religions no matter how primitive, how 
ridiculous they may seem to us, embody some rational truth. 
These moments of truth are phases in the realiz~tion of the 
Idea, early stages in its process toward perfect self-
realization. Students of the history of religions must 
seek out the -rational element in them and interpret it. 
It must always be remembered that these religions were be-
lieved by numerous people and nothing human is without 
shade of reason. The various stages of sophistication of 
the conception of God gives rise to a definite classifica-
tion of these religions into three main divisions: (1) 
Na~ure Religions~ (2) Religions ~which spiritual indiv-
-
iduality asserts itself, and (3) Religions of free person-
ality. 
3. Revealed Religion.l 
Hegel tells us that this weary cycle of manifestation, 
development and determination does not continue forever. 2 
Indeed, the end or goal of complete manifestation or self-
realization is determined by the eternal counsel of' God. 
The absolute or revealed religion takes up all partial re-
flections, f'alse when taken alone, into itself'. Christian-
1 Ibid., I, 83. 
2. Ibid., I, 83. 
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i ty is the one arid only revealed religion. 3 In it tb.e 
Idea.,of religion is perfectly realized so that this re-
ligion is unlike the positive pre-Christian religions in 
that it is absolutely true, it is not finite nor temporary. 
It is the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation which fully 
realizes religion 1 s essential Notion-the intrinsic unity 
of the Divine and human nature. Hegel closes his Intro-
duction with these words: 
The course thus followed by religion is the true 
theodicy; it exhibits all products of Spirit, every 
form of its self-knowledge, as necessary, because 
Spi.~i t is some thing living, working, and its impulse 
is to press on through the series of' its manifestations 
towards the consciousness of itself as embracing all 
truth.l 
libid., I, 85. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ~OEPTI~ OF RELIGION 
A. The Religious Attitude 
In the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences 
Hegel res?lves his system of philosophy into three main 
divisions. In the first he is concerned with the science 
()if':· the Idea~ or the Logic; the second deals with the Idea 
as it goes ,forth from itself as Nature and in the third 
the Idea becomes incarnate in man as Spirit. This last 
part is further subdivided into art, religion, and phil-
osophy proper, each representing a progressive step to-
wards the :fuller comprehension o:f' the .&.bsolut e SpB::ri t. 
In the philosophy of religion the work o:f' the preceding 
divisions of philosophical study is presupposed. Hence~ 
Hegel. feels no need to justif'y·his starting point.1 He 
turns at once to our ordinary consciousness~ and, accept-
ing the subjective data as his point d~ depart, begins his 
philosophical investigation of religion from there. 
~at is God for our ordinary consciousness? To this 
Hegel answers that what God is uis something we are fam-
iliar with- a substantial truth which is present in our 
subjective consciousness.u2 Such a. conception of God as 
lnegel, Lectures on The Philosophy of Religion, I, 89. 
2J:bid., I, 90. 
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a familiar idea which we all have is not what the 
philosophy o~ religion deals with. Indeed, Hegel 
assumes that his philosophy, principa~~7 the first part, 
has clearly exhibited God as flthe absolutely True, the 
universal in-and-for-itself, the All-comprehending, 
All-containing, that from which everything derives sub-
sistence.ttl Such a view of God not only is the result 
of philosophy but also is confirmed by an appeal to the 
·religious consciousness. That which is given confusedly 
but none-the-less certainly to our religious conscious-
ness must attain to the i'orm of· thought. And here the 
philosophy of religion enters i'or the express purpose of 
explicating this Ufulness of the heartft in the form of 
thought, i.e. the.Notion.2 
In the beginning, then, God is manifested as abso-
lute Universality. 3 This Universality is not to be under-
stood as abstract, outside of which existent objects have 
any independent exis.tence. But, rather, God as absolute 
Universality is concrete and full of content beside which 
there is no other. This Universal is marked by no limit-
ations, no particularity and no finitude. All existing 
things whether natural or ~iritual find their root and 
subsistence in the One alone. Hegel expresses it thus: 
libid., I, 90. 
-
2' Ibid., I, 91. 
3' Ibid., I, 91. 
4t 
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11 God. is the absolute Substance, the only true reality. 
All else, which is real, i'/:1 not real in it fJeJ .. f, has no, 
real existence of itself; the one absolute reality is 
God alone, and thus He is the absolute Substance. nl 
Abstraqtly maintained., such a doctrine is Spinozism .. 
When this Universal is conceived of as concrete, rich 
and full it is Spirit, eternally undifferentiated and 
forever at home with Himself. 
To Which of our mental faculties does this Universal 
manifest itself? Hegel rejects the will,. the imagination. 
and the feeling as providing the proper substratum for 
the Universal content in favor of Thought which itself, 
is the activity of the Universal. 17The content is this 
.. 
absolutely undivided,. continuous, selt~sufficing One, the 
Universal, and Thought is the mode of mind for which this 
Universal exists.tr2 As absolute Universality, God at 
once comprehends all finite particularity in Himself and 
also furnishes the foundation and true content of indivi-
dual things. Such a view is not subject to the charge of 
pantheism because it is not the individual things in their 
empirical existence which are.God, but rather the Universal 
which alone has essential being. We have, says Hegel 
this divine Universality--Spirit in its entirely unde-
termined Universality- for which there exists absolutely 
1Ibid., I, 92. 
2' Ibid., I, 95. 
no element of difference. But upon this absolute 
foundation (and this we state for tbe moment as fact) 
there no appears tba. t element of distinction mich, 
in its spiritual character, is consciousness, and it 
is with this distinction that religion, as such, 
begins.l 
B. The Forms of the Religious Consciousness 
In discussing the forms in which religion manifests 
itself to the religious consciousness Hegel treats re-
ligion on its phenomenal side, a persistent tracin~ of the 
e1evation of the human spirit from earth to heaven. He 
distinguishes three forms or religious attitudes, all of 
a. psychological kind, in which the religious spirit man-
ifests itself. All these forms, subjectively considered, 
have one thing in common, namely, a present consciousness 
of God. This consciousness o.f God manifests it sel.f as an 
immadiate relation between God and man and carries with 
it its own credentials, as it were, its own certitude. 
It is a certainty which is inseparably bound up with the 
certainty of my own being. Hegel says that we express 
this truth in a forcible manner when we say 111 I am as 
certain o.f this as of my own existence.n2 
Now the .fact that we are conscious of God means, 
simply, that we bave ideas of Him, that He is an Obj3 ct 
to us. To say that a thing is an object of consciousness 
l Ibid., I, 100. 
2" Ibid., I, 116. 
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is to say that the content is in me, that it is mine. 
But God a.s Absolute Universality has an existence of' His 
0'\1\ltl wholly independent of' me.. God is a Being who tran-
scends all that is finite and phenomenal. He is, in short, 
Universal, and as such, He appeals to and can be appre-
hended only by an organ which is itself' universal. 
We are rational or spiritual beings only by virtue 
of' the fact that we are able to transcend our ow.n indi-
viduality and particularity and are able to rise above 
the levels of' feeling and sensation into the _pure region 
of' ~e universal, the objective. The self' is able to rise 
above the world of' objects on the one hand and above 
the individual self' on the other, and, in thought, achieve 
a higher unity which comprehends both these elements. 
It is in thought that we overcome the opposition between 
the self' and the not-self. It is in thought that we 
pass beyond our petty individuality 'With its passing 
impressions into the region of the universal and the 
infinite. It is because of' this ability of self-trans-
cendence that man is capable of' religion. 
At this point we must be careful to avoid a pitfall. 
For to say that man is a religious creature because he is 
rational is not to say that religion is a purely intellect-
ual thing. During Hegel r s time the question was everywhere 
being asked "To what specific :faculty of human conscious-
ness does religion belong?ft Is religion essentially a 
matter of feeling, knowledge or volition? 
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Such questions issue from a faulty psychology. To 
divide the consciousness of man into separate and dis-
tinct powers or faculties which somehow come together 
with the •mind" as their substratum is to misrepresent 
the facts of our experience. Can one divorce feeling 
or volition totally from knowledge? Does knowledge re-
side in a mind which is absolutely free from any element 
of feeling or activity? Hegel would admit that while 
calling attention to the various ways consciousness man-
ifests itself, i.e. rationally, emotionally, volitionally 
et cetera, is to perform a helpful task, it in no way 
represents the function of crnnsciousness as it really is. 
Instead, consciousness must be thought of as a spiritual 
unity of which the various elements neces.sarily involve 
one another and which are the correlative expressions 
of a common principle- and this common principle is 
thought. 
Thought, intelligence, self-consciousness, is not 
one among many coordinate faculties, having its 
own peculiar functions, its own particular times 
and ways of action, but it is that which runs through, 
characterizes, gives organic relation to, all our 
spiritual activities.! 
God may touch our feelings, stir our emotions and do-
lJohn Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Religion (Glascow: James Maclehose, 1880), p. 162 
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minates our actions, yet under it all and through it all 
is active tba. t organ by which we grasp things eternal, 
and that organ is Thought. 
Our original question still persists although in 
a different fb rm. If thought penetrates into every man-
ifestation of our consciousness, into our feeling, our 
desiring, our willing, then, we may ask, what is the 
special form of thought to ~ich religion belongs? If 
Qed only manifests Himself to pure thought then religion 
would necessarily consist of well-defined ideas or doc-
trines developed into an ordered system. But there are 
multitudes ~o witness to the fact of their consciousness 
of God but who potH:J.ess little if any systematic theology. 
There are multi tudes who are daily conscious of the idea 
of beauty or goodness but who could not, on that account, 
translate the experience into an e~plicit theory of aes-
thetics or morality. 
Considerations such as these have led many to ques-
tion knowledge as the essential element in religion. 
Ignorance and error do not, in fact, altogether vitiate 
religion. Indeed, we might ask to what extent they can 
intrude Without affecting that which eon~f:titutes the real 
essence of it. Before presenting his own view, Hegel 
discusses the popular belief which has gained the assent 
of many mature minds, that feeling is the proper seat 
of religion. 
Hegel defines religious feeling as uthat element in 
wbi ch faith in God is given to us, and as tba t inmost 
region in which it is :for us absolutely certain that God 
is. ul In our hearts God is known intuitively by means of 
sensibilities that are touched and affections that are 
moved. It is our feeling and not our reason that pro-
vides the ~€lund of our certitude. We should not look 
to the understanding to find God. He is not to be dis-
covered at the end of any syllogism or at the conclusion 
of any scientif'i·c experiment. The reason as that form of 
consciousness which deals With terms, propositions and 
systematically arnanged doc~rines can never lead us to 
the One who is nearer to us than we are to ourselves. 
Protagonists of this view usually appeal to the 
testimony of' popular conviction as well as considerations 
of a more scientific character. It. seems evident that 
our powers of ratiocina. tion, 'Whether in a state of acute-
ness and activity or in a state of lassitude and languor 
do not constitute the measure of' piety. The scholar 
whose intelligence has been developed to akeen degree 
of excellence is no nearer the kingdom of God than 
1Ibid., I, 125. 
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a common person~ who, could not define in an intelligible 
form a single doctrine of the faith in which he believes. 
This reminds one of the words of the great French philo-
/ 
sopher, Rene Descartes, Who, in the account which he gives 
of his own intellectual development, re-echoes what is 
commonly held when he says; ttr honoured our Theology and 
aspired as much as anyone to reach to heaven, but ••• [I] 
learned to regard it as a most~highiy-assured fact that 
the road is not less open to the most ignorant than to the 
most learned. 1•1 Indeed, if religion is possible to all 
peoples then it cannot depend on any special gifts or 
arbitrary requirements • 
. Neither can the seat of religion be found in the 
sphere of action since practical activity issues forth 
from inward principles and motives. Our actions do not 
stem from the will alone but from the desires and affections 
of the heart Which lie behind it. 
Professor John Gaird, who is ~oroughly Hegelian in 
spirit and whose Introduation to the Philosophy of Re-
ligion shows considerable Hegelian influence, summarizes 
the popular case for feeling as the proper seat of religion 
in man when he says: 
And so, trthe ultimate source and secret of the reli-
lRen/ Descartes, aDiscourse on Method, • The Philoso-
phical Works of Descartes, trans. by E~ s. Haldane and G. 
R. T. Ross (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), I, 85. 
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gious nature is to be found neither in the philoso-
phic intelligence nor in the feeling of external 
achievement, but in the feelings of' self-abnegation, 
of conscious dependence, of awe, reverence, aspira-
tion- in that disposition or attitude of' the heart 
towards God, call it what you will, which often gives 
moral elevation to the humblest intelligence, and 
sheds grandeur around the homeliest and obscurest 
life.l 
But there are considerations of a more philosophical 
nature which may be advanced in :favor of the position. 
In feeling we ba ve the merging of two different kinds 
of Being, which, in re:t'lection, are posited as One Being. 
This abstract assertion can be elucidated by a simple 
illustration which is Hegel's own. When I say, for 
example., '"I feel something hard, u the nrv is the one and 
the- "son:e thingn is the Other. There are tW"O of them. 
- -
That Vlhich is common to them both is the hardness. In 
feeling there is a community of the two, the object 
touches me and I am filled with its specific quality. Now., 
when we say "I0 and '"Object,• the two exist independently; 
nit is only in-feel~ that the double Being vanishes.n2 
. 
The determinate quality or character of the object becomes 
one with my empirical self-consciousness. 
Hegel rejects the sentiment that feeling is something 
subjective.3 Indeed, within the pure state of feeling the 
1John Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of' Religion, 
p .. 168 .. 
~egel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, 126 
3' . Ibid.,I, 127. 
.e 
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object and the Ego form one undifferentiated unity and the 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity has not 
yet arisen. The human mind, in knowing, creates a theo-
retical distance between the subject and the object which 
is not present in the felt-wholeness of feeling. In 
knowing, ~e Ego stands in opposition to the object and, 
in an attitude of detachment, cooly contemplates and 
examines it. But in feeling all opposition vanishes, 
the determination of the object becomes one wtth the 
determination of my own inmost nature, so that, in a very 
real sense, they are no longer two, but one. Indeed, the 
object becomes blended with the consciousness to which it 
is revealed so that all sense of foreignness and estrange-
ment is gone. 
This, many would urge, is exactly the case when God 
meetg man in the depths of his soul. His Holy Presence 
penetrates the soul through and through so that all di-
vision and intermediation are at an end. The soul becomes 
wholly determined by God, He takes complete possession of 
us so that the certainty of His existence becomes identi-
fied with the assurance of our own and He becomes, in a 
sense, spiritually one with us. 
In .feeling ••• the Ego exists in this immediate 
simple unity, in a condition in which it is wholly 
filled with determinate character, and does not go 
beyond this character. Thus I am, as feeling, ,~orne­
thing entirely special or particular; I am th~ 
...... "·>-
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roughly immersed in determinateness, and am in the 
strict sense o~ the word subjective only, without 
objectivity and without universality.l 
Does this not call to our minds the extravagant 
terms in Which saints and mystics have expressed this 
total self-ef~acement under the felt presence of God? 
William James, in his fascinating book, The Varieties of 
Religious Exper:ience, includes a great many interesting 
.accounts by people who have experienced this mystical 
unity in which the boundaries between themsel vas and God 
are dissolved. 2 
Now, although Hegel would grant that there is much 
truth in what has been said, he would be quick to point 
out certain difficulties with the view. In the first 
place man, says Hegel, is Spirit, consciousness, Idea, 
and as such the Ego, of necessity distinguishes itself 
from its determinate state at any particular moment. 3 
I. 
Man cannot remain in the. state of pure feeling but nec-
essarily advances from feeling to reflection in which a 
distinction is made between the "I" and its determinate 
libid., I, 127. 
2cf. especially the chapter on Mysticism. On page 
397 there is a particularly interesting footnote suggest-
ing that Hegelt s Absolute Being ttwith all its otherness 
soaked up into itself" may have originated because of the 
susceptibility of Hegel t s consciousness to mystical moods. 
3Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, 129. 
58. 
state. 
And then too~ just the ~act that something is in my 
~eeling can in no way be taken as an evidence of its being 
true. Because a oontent is found in my feeling does not 
mean that this content is, in itself, anything very .fine. 
nan the contrary,n says Hegel, nthe kingliest flower 
- - ~ 
springs from the srune soil and side by side with the 
rgnkest weeds.•l To put God on the level o~ feeling is 
to give him no -·adv~tage over the worst possible things. 
HOw do we distinguish between the feeling of right and 
wrong, of' love and hatred, of God and the devil? Surely, 
not by l:l'lBre feeling, but by a c:Viterion which is external 
to feeling, namely, an intelligible, rational insight 
into the real worth o.f these objects .felt. The pleasures 
of the sensualist are .felt as well as the raptures of 
the saint, and mere feeling vindicates the one as well as 
the other. 
Consequently, feeling is a form, or mould, for every 
possible kind of content, and this content receives 
no determination there from which could affect its own 
independent existence, its being in-and-for-self. 
Feeling is the fonn. in which the content appears as 
perfectly accidental, for it may just as well be po-
sited by my caprice, or good pleasure, as by Nature. 
~ • • Thus when the Being of God is shown to be pre-
sent in feeling, it is just as accidental there as 
all else to mich this being may belong.2 
libid., I, 130. 
2:i:bid., I, 131. 
This is subjectivity in its worst sense, a subjectivi~ 
which is mere contingency or fortuitousness. 
Hegel further points out that when a man appeals to 
feeling all communication ceases and he is withdrawn into 
the sphere of his own contingency.l In this realm every 
man constitutes his own object as something peculiar to 
hiJ:P,selt'. Communion and publicity are to be found in the 
sphere of thought, of ~e Notion~ the sphere of the Uni-
versal, of rationality. The nature of the real object 
is before us only in thought and it is only upon this 
common ground that we are able to gain any understanding 
of it. 
In short, feeling in religion merely shows that the 
religion is mine, that it is a part o:f my experience. 
The fact that I feel anything carries with it no objective 
-
criterion for judging its worth. Whatever truth there 
may be, and there certainly is some, in religious feeling, 
/ 
it is not there simply because it pertains to a being 
who feels, but because the feeling is that of a spiritual 
or self-conscious being. 
It should be Irept clearly in mind that the con-
clusion which Regel draws from his examination of the 
form of feeling is that religion must be felt, must be 
libid., I, 131. 
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in the heart, but it must be intelligible feeling. That 
is, Hegel does not wish to deny the continuous element 
of feeling in religion for he maintains that it is essen-
tial to its truth being ours. Rather, he rejects that form 
of faith which is content to rest upon feeling as its 
sufficient ground and insists that we must recognize the 
necessity of thought in sifting the gpod from the bad, 
the true from the false. 
Recognizing the inadequacy of feeling as a sufficient 
ground ·for our faith, 11we must now therefore, ft writes . 
- -Hegel, nlook around us for another basis for God.n ~In 
-feeling, 11 he continues, ttwe have not found God either in 
- -
accordance with His independent Being, or in accordance 
with His oontent .• nl With this Regel turns to the form 
in which man objectifies the absolute, that is, sensuous 
intuition. 
2. The Form of Sensuous Intuition or Perception. 
Hegel tells us that art arose as a result of the 
feeling that the Divine should exist as an object for 
-
consciousness., nThe law and content of art is Truth as 
·- . 
it appears in mind or Spirit, and is therefore spiritual 
truth, but spiritual truth in such a form that it is at 
the same time sensuous truth.fl2 ~t, then, as the repre-
libid., I, 127. 
2Ibid., I, 127. 
sentation of truth, is the work of man. In simpler 
words we are to understand that the images and gods of 
wood and stone which have been fashioned by men t s hands 
~ 
were taken by them_as na representation of something 
higher and invisible. ttl In the mind of the artisan 1tthe 
- . 
union of the notion or conception and of reality has 
already implicitly taken place.:tt2 When the object is 
~ 
realized the Idea exists in a sensuous form and a definite 
shape-the absolute is, as it were, objectified. 
Hegel suggests that in perception we have a dichotomy 
between the two elements which constitute the religious 
relation--namely, the object and self-consciousness. The 
object is there it is true but the object is not itself 
self-consciously religious. It must be taken as an 
object of religious devotion by a perceiving subject. Art, 
although it has the objectivity which feeling lacked, 
attains to subjectivity and self-consciousness only in the 
perceiving subject. nThe religious process," Hegel writes, 
"belongs, indeed, to the perceiving subject only, and 
-yet it is not complete in the subject, but needs the object 
perceived by sense. On the other hand, the object is the 
truth, and yet it needs in order to be true, the self-
consciousness which lies outside it_.u3 
1Ibid.# I, 139. 
. 
2Ibid .. ~ I, 139. 
3ibid., 
. 
I, 141. 
Now -wb.a t is needed is this; in place o:f the dicJmotomy 
between th.e object on the one hand and self-consciousness 
on the other~ we must posit a unity in which the totality 
of the religious relation is preserved. Hegel sums up 
the requirement thus: VTruth attains to objectivity, in 
~ 
which its content as exisLing on its own account is not 
merely something posited, but exists essentially in the 
form of subjectivity itself, and the entire process takes 
place in the element of self-consciousness.nl 
-With this in mind we now turn to the general idea o:r> 
o:r-dinary thought which is the first place the religious 
consciousness find these conditions satisfied. 
3. The Form of Idea or Ordinary Thought. 
As we have seen, the popular consciousness as 
opposed to the scientific or philosophic consciousness 
dwells in the region of symbols, images, figurate or 
pictorial representations of ideas under a sensuous form. 
But even the popular consciousness is capable of eman-
cipating itself from the sensuous and the accidental in 
its own representations and, by means of language, of 
rising nearer to the universal level of scientific thought. 
Ordinary language drops the medium of sensuous images 
libido~ I, 141. 
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and communication is made through ideas in their own pure 
and ideal forms. Much of ordinary language is derived 
from the world of sense and is based on material types 
and analogies. In many cases, however, the material or 
pictorial basis has faded away. They have ceased to be 
metaphorical and the mind in using them is no longer 
conscioY,s of their sensuous reference but has elevated 
them into the imm.edia te exponents of spiritual or super-
sensuous things. Consider the language of the Bible and 
of devotional literature of ell ages as a case in point, 
and it ~11 be seen that the world of sense and imagi-
nation has been gleaned for the choicest imagery to ex-
press the invisible and the spiritual. Religious language 
abounds with anthropomorphisms, but, and this is tbe 
~portant point, the ordinary consciousness recognizes 
for· the most part that these are not to be taken literally 
but only metaphorically or spiritually. 
UGeneral idea or ordinary thought," says HegelJJ ttis 
- - ·-
the picture lifted up into the form of Universality, of 
thought, so that the one fundamental characteristic, 
Which constitutes the essence of the object,. is held fast, 
and is ,t:tr> esent before the mind which thus forms the idea. ttl 
Hegel goes on to say that the idea, in rising beyond the 
• level of the purely sensuous but not so far as to reach 
the level of speculative thought where all association 
with the sensuous is forever severed, "is in a state o:f 
constant unrest between immediate sensuous perception, 
on the one hand, and thought proper on the o ther.nl 
-· 
This elevation of the sensuous into thought is accomplished 
bj7' means of abstraction, but an abstraction which is never 
complete. 
General idea or ordinary thought is still essentially 
entangled with the sensuous; it requires it, and 
requires to enter on this contest with the sensuous 
in order to exist. The sensuous element, therefore., 
belongs essentially to idea, aluaough idea never 
permits the sensuous to enjoy an independent validity. 
FUrther, the Universal, of which idea is conscious, 
is only ~e abstract Universality of its object, 
only its undetermined Essence, or approximate nature. 
In order to give a determinate character to that 
essence, it again requires what is determined by 
Sense, the pictorial; but to this as being sensuous 
it gives the position of something which is separate 
from what is signified by it, and treats it as a 
point at which it is not permissible to remain, as 
something which only serves to represent the proper 
or true content which is separate from it.2 
What Hegel means can be fairly easily illustrated 
by turning to specific exa.mples. When "VIle speak of the 
Father and the Son in the Trinity we do not mean to 
affirm that the·- relationship is the same as the relation 
of a human father and son. The terms t Sont or tbegetting, t 
libid._. I, 145. 
2Ibid., I, 144. 
• 
• 
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Hegel tells us, are 
only a figure derived from a natural relation, 
regarding which we know quite well that it is not 
intended to be understood in its immediate sense, 
but that what is indicated is rather a relation 
which is only approximately the one here described, 
and that this sensuous relation has in it what 
oo rresponds most nearly to the relation which is 
taken in the st:r>ict sense in :r>egard to God.l 
The same is t:r>ue when we s,t:e .ak of the wrath of' God, His 
:r>epentance or His vengenee. It is obvious that such fo:r>ms 
of speech have disengaged themselves, in a great measure, 
of the picto:r>ia1 or fig'llrative tbat lurks in them and 
have beoome clothed from the inne:r> :r>esources of thought 
with a :r>eal though supersensuous significance which :r>enders 
them f'it expressions of' things t:r>anscending the outward 
and the sen suo us. 
When we read of' a Divine Being who has eyes to 
behold the :r>ighteous, ears to listen to their praye:r>, 
to Whom the smell of incense or the savour of sacri-
fice is sweet; when He is represented as seated on 
a throne, according a place of' honoll!' at His right 
hand, having a local dwell.ing called be aven, coming 
down or despatching em.ndssaries from heaven to 
earth; as working, being fatigued and taking rest; 
or again, when we are 'Gold of His wrath as being 
:r>oused or abated, of' His avenging personal insults 
and offences, of' His repenting of former acts or 
intentions, of His being induced by persuasion, 
intreaty, or interposition, to give up His former 
purposes, of His making and revising schemes, 
oontracts, oo venants, with mutual stipulations and 
penalties :for breach of bargain;-in all these cases, 
even in its most immature stage of spiritual culture, 
the religious mind passes beyond the anthropomorphic 
libid., I, 145 • 
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fig~as to seize, in ~ indefinitei but not unreal 
way, the hidden _spiritual meaning. 
The function of ordinary language for the religious 
mind is simply to let it suggest, or in the way of imagi-
n·ative indication, awaken 1n us conceptions of spiritual 
things. As language it is defective and lacking in 
preci sicin and yet it is adequat_e for the needs of tbe 
religious nature. Limited though it is, ordinary thought 
rescues religion from the mire of' subje cti vi ty in which 
it is enveloped if its essence be found in feeling alone. 
"As compared with feeling, tt writes Regel, 11in 'Which the 
~ -
content exists ·as a specific state of' the subject, and 
consequently as contingent, idea implies that fhe content 
is lifted up into objectivity.P2 The objectivity of 
ordinary thought gives us a standard to which feeling 
must conf'orm. and by which it can be measured. 
The content of the absolute spirit is the Absolute, 
which is thought. In the different moments of the sphere 
of absolute spirit, however, this thought, the Idea, 
takes on different f'orms. On the one hand we have art 
in which the Idea takes on tile form of sense-object; on 
the other hand w~ have philosophy in which it takes the 
form of thought. Hence it can be seen that in philosophy 
content and form are identical--both are thought. But in 
the middle we have religion in which the content is the 
same, viz. absolute thought, but the fo!'m. is intermediate-
lOaird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1.84. 
2Hegel, Lectures dn the Philosophy of Religion, I, 150. 
·e 
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ordinar,r thought• It struggles between the sensuous and 
the purely rational. Hegel, you will remember, represents 
this Vorstellung, this picture-thinking, this pictorial 
or figurative thought as being "in a state of' constant 
-
unrest between immediate sensuous perception, on the one 
hand, and thought proper on the other.nl 
Hegel regards this f'igurative though~ or picture-
thinking which is expressed in the various religions of 
the world as the highest kind of thinking of which the 
ordinary man is capable. The truth is possessed by the 
. 
masses in the popular form of religion whereas it is 
seen in its pure f·orm only in philosophy. In order to 
judge th~ truth of any particular religion it is necessary 
to strip away its sensuous and figurative garb and examine 
its inmr thought-content. It is in this sense that 
Christianity is regarded by Hegel as the one absolutely 
true religion.. Not that the figurative expressions such 
as Father and Son, Heaven, Creation, Hell ~ cetera are 
true as they stand, but simply that the inner meaning, 
when examined, is seen to be identical with the principles 
of true philosophy. 
To say ihis much, however, is to get ahead of our-
selves. In chapters five and six ww shall attempt to 
exhibit what Hegel considers to be the truth which lurks 
behind the semi-sensuous dress of ordinary language as it 
:r ~.,I, 145. 
is found to some extent in De~inite religions, fu. e.$ 
~e-Christian religions, and supremely in the Absolute 
religion--Christianity. In this chapter we have don-
68. 
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sidered the forms in which the Idea or the Absolute has 
mani~ested it. sel~ to the religious consciousness and as 
a result we are able to arrive at a general de~inition 
or notion o~ religion which will serve us as we pass to 
the discussion of particular religion: Religion, it might 
be said, is the manifestation o~ the Absolute in the form 
of picture-thought.l 
libid., I, 18; III, 148 and especially 366. 
CHAPTER V 
DEFINITE RELIGION 
In Part One o:r the Lectures on the Philo so ;phy o:f 
. 
Religion, Hegel attempts to give a full explication of 
the true idea (Begri:t.f) and content o:f religion. To this 
~ 
we have given some attention in the previous chapter. 
In Part Two of his lectures, Hegel turns to a study o.f the 
various positive or pre-Christign religions in which the 
Idea bas been inadequately embodied. It is Regel's con-
. -
tention that all religions, no matter how pr~itive, are 
specific determinations of the dialectic of the Idea and 
that persistent study will reveal this kernel of trui:h 
underneath much superstition and mythology. 
This Idea is absolute, and is itself' a living process 
. -
of self-explication or of organic development, entering 
tbe world of time and space and embodying it self in various 
historical :forms, but always with immanent finality, present 
in the lowest .forms and gradually advancing through more 
adequate ones till it reac-hes that of Christianity. tfJlowever 
erroneous a religion may be, URegel writes in his Philosophy 
-
·of History, 11it possesses truth, although in a mutilated 
phase. In every religion there is a divine presence, a 
divine relation; and a philosophy of history has to seek 
out the spiritual element even in the most imperfect 
forms. ttl 
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The Idea of religion constitutes its inmost truth. 
A true or actual religion. is one which is adequate to its 
notion or conception.2 All religions, says Regel, in 
order to be called religions "must contain it or else 
they would not be religions.•3 But the notion or conception 
is present in them in different ways. At first they contain 
it implicitly only. nThese definite religions are but 
particular moments of the notion, and for that very reason 
they do not correspond with it, for it does not exist in an 
actual shape in them.n~ 
We can summarize the matter by saying that the various 
positive religions are the self-posited determinations or 
differences of one and the same Idea; and the philosophy 
of religion is the science, that is, the intelligent recog-
nition of the Idea in its various self-posited differences. 
Christianity, as a positive form of religion, is identical 
with the absolute religion. In Idea it is the absolute re-
lG. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 
trans • .r. Sibree {London: G. Bell, 1881.) p. 196. 
2G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 
:I;:, 262. 
3Ibid., I, 262. 
4Ibid., I, 262. 
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ligion ~ile in the actuaL realization of the Idea in 
time~ it is seen in tile process of development, with all 
the distortions and limitations Vlhich all historical develop-
ment implies. In Chapter Five we shall deal more fully 
.with Christianity as the Absolute religion. 
Hegelts method, then, in the study of the positive 
.. 
religions involves two steps, namely (1) an attempt to 
oomprehend the idea of religion and its necessity and (2) 
--
an examination and interpretation of the mass of infor-
mation gathered by empirical and historical methods in the 
light of this self-differentiating Idea. This gives Hegel 
a basis for classification of fonns of religion. His class-
if-ication begins with the Idea of religion and follows the 
logical development of this Idea as illustrated. and manifested 
. 
in the positive religions, each one being recognized as a 
moment or elem:en t of the Idea itself. Every religion in-
cluded in the classification must realize and express, 
·however faintly, the Idea of religion. 
·The most primitive savage, however, lowly, is a ma.n, 
and as such he mm.ifests the idea of man. We may say that 
the Idea is in him, making him as much of a man as he is; 
but he does not fully ·manifest the Idea of man. It is only 
in the God-man of Christianity that the Idea of man and of 
religion are fully reali~ed.· Hegel finds religion essentiaL 
• to :man as man. Where you ba ve no religion you do not have 
man. On the other hand where you have perfect religion you 
have ~rfect ma.n-the Son o:f God. Between these two are 
the diverse forms of religion in organic relation, culminat-
ing in the incarnation as the manifestation o:f the idea o:f 
absolute and perfect religion. The Idea of religion is, 
then, the organic relation o:f God and man. Reconciliation 
or vital relationship is the motive of all religions, with 
however much extraneous :ma. tter this central motive may be 
allied. 
Hegel Classifies all pre-Christian religions in one 
or the other of two categories; (1) Nature religions, a.nd 
· (2) Religions of Spiritual Individuality. In Nature religions, 
the lowest form of religion, oonsciousness has not yet 
distinguished its object from its sensuous self. Since 
the object; is immediate and identical With its sensuous 
self' the manifold indeterminate objects of nature are wor-
shiped. The religions of spiritual individuality exhibit 
the spliritual as entirely purified and free f'rom nature. 
·Spirit descends iniD the depths of' its own being, and 
.1;>eoo gnizes the abstract .fundamental principle as the 
Spiritual. Nature is now depressed to the condition 
of a mere creature, an.d Spirit now for tl:e first 
time occupies the Chief place. God is known as the 
Creator of all men, as he is of all nature, and as 
..{lbso lute Causality .1 
Now let us look a little more closely at Hegelts classi-
fication of.religions. 
73. 
A. Nature Religions 
Under the classification af Nature Religions Hegel 
makes several divisions and sub-divisions. In the first 
place he heals with (A) lll1Dl9 diate religion which includes 
the magic and witchcraft of primitive peoples. Following 
this he considers (B) the religions which manit'est a dis-
ruption of the religious consciousness within itself. By 
this Hegel refers to the attitude in which the subject 
still considers himself as a natural sensuous existence, 
but opposes to himself a substance or essence of nature. 
He regards himself as nothing: nature as substance is all. 
Under this category Hegel treats (l) the Chinese religion 
of the measure of temperate conduct ~secular life, (2) 
the religion of phantasy--Brahmsnism, and (3) the religion 
o:t being-in-itself, or Buddhism. And then finally, he 
treats (0) a group of religions which occupy a middle 
place between the Nature Religions and the Religion o:f 
Spiritual In:lividuality. This latter group ba calls the 
. . 
~Religions of Nature in transition to the Religions af 
Spiritual Individuality.ul Within this category he includes 
(1) the duaristic religion of the Persians, (B) the re-
--
ligion of Pain, that is, the Phoenician and Syrian, and. 
-lHegel, Lectures in the Philooophy of Religion, 
II, 65 .. 
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(3) the Egyptian religion of Enigma. 
The study of comparative religion has undergone con-
siderable development since Hegel1 s day. The results of 
modem research in this field would, no doubt, compel us 
to make considerable changes in the specific characteri-
zation which Hegel gives to some of these religions. But 
they cb not change or invalidate the me tb.od 'Which cw. 
readily be adapted to take under its perview any amount of 
new information concerning religious phenomena. As we have 
seen, it is essential tb all religion qua religion to 
embocy, however inadequately, some phase of the'Idea. It 
should be remembered that they a.J:Ie all false when taken 
as final, and all true ao far as they manifest the Idea in 
any of its facets .. 
In the following pages we shall consider these religions 
only in so far as they exb.ibi t some phase of' the Idea. We 
shall pass by a great deal of material of' a pwely historical 
and anthropological character as irrelevant to our pnrpos e 
in this chapter, 'Which is to show as clearly as possible 
the particular moment in each religion in whiCh the Idea 
is manifested. 
J.. Immediate Religion 
Wifh reference to this stage of the religions of 
nature we must, Hegel tells us~r in order to understand it, 
75. 
nForget the ideas and thoughts which are • • • thoroughly 
-
familiar to us., and which even p3 rtain to the superficial 
nature of our education and culture.ul We can, with son:e 
determination, think this kind of religion and in a measure 
understand it but we are never able to enter into the 
experience of it, into the feeling of it. For to do so 
would mean ttto fill up entirely the totality of the sub-
-ject with a similar particular determination, so that it 
\IDUld become our determinateness.n2 This is also true when 
~ 
we consider the fact that the stage of immediate religion 
lies at the farthest distance from us, since., even in order 
to make it intelligible to ourselves, we are obliged to 
forget all the forms of our own culture. 
The specific character of this level of religion is to 
be found in tbe unity of the natural and the spiritual in 
such a m~er that the objective side--God~is posited as 
something natural. uThis particular object,n writes Hegel, 
11this heaven, this sun, this animal, this man-these imm.e-
-diate fonns of existence are known as God.n3 In this 
-primal immediate religion., let it he noted, that man as 
yet bas no higher power than himself.4 The spiritual· 
lHegel, Lectures on the Philo so J2h:;y: of Religion, 
I, res .• 
2Ibid.~ I, 289. 
3:i:bid., I, 286 .. 
4ibia., I, .288. 
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moment in the unity of nature and spirit mentioned above 
here exists in a p~ticular and immediate form. 
Man on this level asks no theoretical questions. 
Indeed, when regarded immediately, mgn is wholly without 
reflection or the power of rising up to thought. It is 
" 
with the entrance of thought, Regel writes, "that more worthy 
conceptions of God first appea~.nl -As a matter of fact, 
-Hegel feels that this first i~diate form of the religion 
of nature is not worthy of the name religion and in-
stead he calls it magic.2 "Anything rational," Hegel con-
-- -
eludes, Uis not to be fonnd in this sphere, and therefore 
-
nothing further can be said about the matter.n3 
2. The Re~ions of Spiritual Disruption 
Regel begins his discussion of this group of religions 
by reminding us again that the true content of the Idea is 
Spirit, ttand a process of the un:rolding or development 
.. -
which $pirit is, is the content o:r the whole PHilosophy of 
Religion. The diff"erent stages at which we find Spirit 
give the different religions.n4 
In this stage man knows himself to be contingent and 
libid., I, 239. 
2ibid., I, 297. 
3J:bid., I, 304. 
4Ibid., I, 320. 
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transient and in this reeling he seeks to rise above his 
own particula.ri ty and the particularity of the things about 
him and reach for the Universal, for the One, which exists 
on its own account. He tries to find an essence to which 
this contingency and conditioned character does not pertain. 1 
At this stage it is gradually recognized that the 
finite is something whose nature consists in this, nthat 
it bas not its Being in its own self, but has that which it 
is in an Other, and this Other is the Infinite. " 2 God must 
-be conceived as Substance. This, we are told, is Pantheism.3 
Let us now consider the fundamental character of Pantheism 
in its more definite forms and under its religious aspects. 
a) The Chinese Religion 
In the Chinese religion, or, as Hegel otherwise calls 
it, the religion of measure, we rise above the stage of 
magic, nsince the particular spirit now distinguishes itself 
-
from Substance, and stands in such a relation toward it that 
it regards it as the universal Power.n4 This religion 
-
represents the earliest historical form of this relation. 
Here Substance is equated with the entire sphere of essential 
Being ani is wholly indeterminate universality, abstract and 
libid., I, 323. 
2Ih:i a., I, 3·27. 
j3J:bid .. , I, 333. 
4' Ibid., I,·' 336. 
. -
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unchangeable. Heaven, or T'ien, as it is called, is the 
objective material representation of thisuniversal Sub-
stance. 
Along with this conception we :find another ide a con-
cerning the Emperor who is regarded as the sovereign upon 
earth. 
It is not Heaven which bas given laws or givesthem, 
laws Which. the people respect, divine laws, laws o:f 
religion, o:f morality. It is not Ttien who governs 
nature; it is the Emperor who governs everything, 
ani he only is in conn~ctian with this Ttien. 
The law of Tao lays down :five precepts :for the regu-
lation o:f a man's relations vftth other men.2 The :first and 
-highest regulates the attitude o:f children to their parents; 
the second demands reverance :for deceased ancestors and the 
dead in general; the third requires the rendering o:f absolute 
obedience to the Emperor; the :fourth governs the mutual 
relations o:f brothers and sisters; and the :fifth sets :forth 
the attitude which is to be assumed towards other men. 
What talre s pla~te in nature is :felt to be contingent 
upon the actions o:f men. When the laws are respected by 
the people, when duties are obse:r>ved, all goes well. All 
natural dis asters such as :famines, :floods or droughts are 
regarded as the result o:f some violation o:f the laws o:f 
reason. When misfortunes strike it is the Emperor who 
libid., I, 337. 
2• Ibid., I, 338. 
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must bring the off'erings, not to propitiate an of'fended 
Deity but merely as a token of his reverance f'or the law. 
Upgri·~,the fulfilment of duty, then, depends the safety and 
prosperity of the people. 
The Chinese religion may thus be called a moral 
religion, and it is from this point of' view that 
it has been found possible to hold that the Chinese 
are a theists. These definite laws of measure and 
specific rules of duty are due for the most part to 
Confucius; his works are principally occupied with 
moral questions of this kind.l 
And again, 
T'ien, this universal power over nature ~ich attains 
to reality by the Authority of the Emperor, is closely 
associated with morals generally, and it was this 
moral aspect especially which was developed by Conf'u-
cius.2 
b) The Religion of Imagination or Phantasz 
The religion of Brahmanism is a religion of extrava-
gant fancy, a pantheism of imagination rather than thought. 
Hegel writes: 
We have-thus the abstract One and the wildness of 
extravagant imagination, which, it is true, is recog-
nized in turn as remaining in identity with what is 
primary, but is not expanded into the concrete unity 
of the Spiritual. The unity of the intelligible realm 
reach.e s. the condition of particula~ :.iiidependen t exis-
tence; this last does not, however, b'eoome absolutely 
free, but remains confined within universal Substance.3 
1 . Ibid., I, 340. 
2Ibid., I, 346. 
3Ibid.,IT, ~· 
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In the previous section we saw that the One universal 
Substance, in its first form, comes to be known as represent-
ing the multitude of essential determinations, ~d the entire 
sphere of these, and not as being in its own self spiritual. 
In this religion, however, we find the beginning or spirit-
uality. Abstractly put, the Universal, or Substance as we 
have otherwise called it, is not merely a multitude of rules 
as was the case in Chinese religion, but rather is Thought. 
This Universality passes beyond that of the former stage in 
that is is self-determining and, hence, is the source of all 
determination. At this level nthe Universal appears for the 
first time as the determining agent, as a Principle, it is 
not yet Spirit, but Abstract Universality generally. . •· 
It is the source of all power, but does not externalise or 
make itself manifest as such. ttl 
These determinations of the divine Essence, Hegel tells 
us, have their existence in the Indian religion, Brahmanism .. 
In this religion the universal substantial element is in 
eternal repose--Being-within-itself. This Substance is called 
by the Hindus Brahma and is regarded by them as the Universal, 
sel~-existing Power. This ~ower is not, like passion, turned 
toward what is other than itself, •but is the quiet, lustre-
-less reflection into itself, which is, however, at the same 
81. 
time determined as Power.•1 
-
In the various cosmogonies of India Brahma is represented 
as world creating. These cosmogonies, all more or less 
barbarous, are so divergent that almost nothing of a .fixed 
character can be derived from them with one exception, 
namely, "that this Thought, which is at home with itself' 
ojf self-~ontained, is the begetting of itsel:r.n2 Power, 
-· 
or this creative activity is Thought. Hegel quotes the 
Code of' Manu which begins thus: ttThe Eternal with one 
thought created water,R and so o~~ 3 He also mentions the 
-Logos doctrine of the fourth gospel in the New Testa.ment 
where God is spoken of as •the Word.u4 
- -Now thought is an activity which is open to man. 
When the Indian says llfi am Brahma"' he is asse:r>ting an 
-
affirmative detennina.tion of God-that He is--, a deter-
mination which is subjective since it has its existence in 
my self-consciousness only and as a result this determination 
is a perfectly empty abst:r>action of Being. This, then, 
is subjective religion--the comprehension of itself by self-
consciousness in relation to its divine world. Brahma is 
thought, man is a thinking being, thus Brahms. has'•essen-
tially an existence in human self-consciousness. The 
libid., II, 11. 
2" 
-Ibid., II, 17 •. 
3ibid.' II, 17. 
4' Ibid., II, 17. 
.. 
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Hindu who puts himself' into the condition of' self-concen-
tration is Brabma. In. describing this tranquil devotion., 
nhis silent meditation~ Hegel writes that nwhen I engage 
- - -
in prayer, sit down, cross my legs over one another, fold 
my bands, and look toward heaven, and concentrate my spirit 
and my thoughts wl thout speaking, I then say within myself', 
t I am Brahma, the Supreme Being. 1 ui 
From wbat has been said it can be seen that the highest 
point of' worship is attained by the annihilation and stupe-
faction of' self-consciousness which results in union wath 
God.. !~~Man, so long as b.e persists in remaining within his 
ow.n consciousness, is, according to the Hindu idea, ungodly.•2 
The person Who has achieved this complete submergence of' 
the consciousness and who is ableto maintain himself' in 
this abstraction is called a yogi. In describing this state 
Hegel writes: 
They renounce all movement, all interests, all inclina-
tion, and give themselves up to a still abstraction; 
they are reverenced and supported by others, they 
remain speechless in rigid torpor, ·looking toward the 
sun or having their eyes closed. Some remain thus 
during their whole life, others f'or twenty or thirty 
years. • • he who succeeds in reaching such motionless-
ness, such lifelessness, is, according to the opinion 
of the Hindus, immersed there~y in the inner life, and 
exists permanently as Brahma. 
lrbid., II, 33. 
2-Ibid., II, 3~.: 
3- -Ibid., II, 34. 
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It must be remembered that this renunciation of self 
has nothing whatever to do 'With the expiation for sin. It 
is not a form of penance entered upon for the purpose of 
atoning to the gods for any kind of transgression or offense. 
These aus teri ties are not to be co :nf'used with the penitential 
acts of Christian ascetics but are undertaken with a view 
to attaining the state o:f Brahm.a. 
But just as Brahma is conceived as the solitary 
self'-enclosed Being, so, too, the exaltation o:f 
the individaul_ self-consciousness which strives, by 
means o:f the austerities just spoken o:f, to render its 
own abstraction something perennial :for itself, is 
rather a flight out o:f the concrete reality of :feel-
ing and living activity. In the consciousness which 
says, si am Brahma, :u all virtues and vices, all gods. 
vanish.l 
• • 
In concluding this section it would be well to consider 
briefly the place o:f worship in the .religion of the Hindus. 
Hegel defines worship as uthe relation of self-consciousness 
-to what is essential, to that which exists in and :for itself; 
it is consciousness of the One in this essence, conscious-:-
ness o:f one r s unity with it~ tt2 From v.h at has been said 
- ~ 
it can be concluded that Brahma has no divine service, no 
temple and no altars. The relation to Brahma contains as 
'- -
yet nothing concrete because he him~elf is merely the 
abstraction of the substantial soul; all :further deter-
mination and content lies outside o:f him. •Thus a worshi~,n 
l Ibid. 1 II, 37. 
2Ibid., II, 41. 
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wri tea Hegel., ttas a substantial relation which e.ff'eatually 
·-
in.fluenaes and directs the concrete man, has no place in 
the relation to Brahma.n1 He goes on to conclude that 
. 
if' such a relation were present here at all, it would have 
to be sought in the adoration o.f the other gods. Such 
worship of' particular deities which are cut o.f.f in a one-
sided manrer .f'rom what is essential, i.e., Brahms., would 
result in a relation to unessential things in natural form 
such as natural objects lilre the sun or a river or else 
animals. Hegel points out that this attitude arises in 
part as a result o.f the Hindu 1 s low evaluation o.f human 
li.fe. For the Hindu life acquires value only by the ne-
gation o.f itsel.f. T.his·explains in part the willingness 
o.f many Hindu men to sacr.i.fice themselves, or women to 
sacri.fice their children. Such actions, it will be re-
membered, are not penances which result .from evil doing. 
Rather, it clearly illustrates that these acts o.f sacrifice 
are .for the purpose of' giving one's sel.f value and this 
-
value can be attained only in a negative way. Hegel con-
cludes his treatment o.f Brahmanism by pointing out that 
Usince no rational determination has been able to attain to 
-~ 
solidity, the entire condition of' this people could never 
1 Ibid., II, 3'7. 
e 
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become a legitimate one, a condition inherently justified, 
and was always :merely a condition on sufferance, a contin-
gent and a per~erted one.ul 
c) The Religion of Being-within-self. 
This stage in religion maintains the same general basis 
as the Indian religion we have just considered. The only 
advimc e vtl.ich we find consists in the felt necessity that 
the wild and unstable chaos of' the Indian religion be re-
duced to a state of' rest. nThis religion of' Being-within-
self' is the concentration and tranquillisation of' spirit 
as it returns out of' the arid disorder of' the Indian religion 
into itself and into essential unity. 112 
~ 
While it is true that this particuJar determination 
of' the Idea is def'ective:.j;n that the Being-within-itself is. 
not as yet concrete it is, nevertheless 11a true determina-
tion of God which oonstitutes the i'oundation.u3 Although 
-imperfect, this religion certainly stands higher than those 
which assert that God cannot be known. lle have not, however, 
passed beyond the standpoint of natural religion Which is 
the immediate form of the Spiritual. Compared with the 
previous stage there is an-· advance made here from fantastic 
personification split up into a countless multitude of forms, 
1 II, 47. Ibid. :J 
-. 
2" ~., II, 48. 
3" Ibid., II, 48. 
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to a personification which is enclosed within definite 
bounds and is actually present. At this stage a human 
being is worshipped. He is regarded as a god who has 
assumed individual form and who presents himself to be 
worshipped. 
This particular determination of the Idea hasits 
historical existence in the religion of Foe among the 
Mongols, the Thib etans in the north and west of China 
and also tba Burmese and Cingalese. This religion is 
known elsewhere as Buddhism or Lamaism. It is, says 
Hegel, the most widely spread of religions and claims 
the greatest number of adherents.l 
Considering the general· abstract conception of this 
religion we discover that it has certain definite features. 
The absolute foundation of this religion rests in the 
stillness of being-within-itself in which all differences 
cease. aThus the Absolute,w writes Hegel, "as being-within-
- . - . 
itself, is the Undetermined, the annihilation of all 
particularity, so that all particular existences, all actual 
things, are merely something accidental, are merely Form 
having no significance.u2 This leads us to the second feature~ 
~ . 
nothing and not-being is what is ultimate and supreme. 
libid .. , II, 50. 
2Ibid., II, 50. 
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It is nothing alone which has true independence; 
all other actuality, all particularity, has none at 
all. Out of nothingness everything bas proceeded; 
into nothingness everything returns. Nothing, noth-
ingness is the One, the beginning and the ending of 
everything. However, diverse men and things may be, 
there is but the One· principle- Nothingness- out o:t: 
which they pr>oceed, and it is form alone which con-
stitutes the quality, the diversity.l 
It may seem strange at first sight to think of God 
as nothingness. But, considered more closely, this deter-
mination means that God is absolutely nothing determined .. 
He is completely undetermined and in saying this we are the 
victims' of' language. For to call God the Undetermined is, 
grammatically ~eaking, giving him a determination. Here we 
must forget the words that we use for communication and 
fix our attention upon the concept of the complete lack of 
determination. This is equiv2llent to saying that God is 
the negation of all p~!!?.ticularity. Hegel points out that 
the modern manner of saying that we cannot know God is but 
a milder expression for the conviction that •God is nothing-
ness," completely empty, indefinite.2 
-Although God is conceived o:f as the Essence of Essences 
or as pure nothingness, he is known as a particular human being, 
as Foe, Buddha, Dalailama. Hegel immediately points out that 
this is not to be confused with the Christian doctrine of 
libid., II, 51. 
2-Ibid., II, 51. 
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the Incarnation~ which, says Hegel, llis something alto-
gether different.tt1 In Chris-tianity-it is not man in his 
sensuous, immediate existence that is worshipped but man 
who has taken on the form of Spirit. 
Here ~e idea presents itself that a man is universal 
Substance in his act of meditation, when he is occupied 
with himself'~ when he is absorbed in himself.. This notion 
of a god taking on human form must not b€1 understood as 
occuring but once in history. Hegel tells us that those 
who vo rship Buddha or the Dalailama also worship Foe .2 
As a matter of fact it is related that Foe incarnated 
himself eight thousand times. 
When one turns to the worship or cultus of this religion 
one finds a set of' values and a code of conduct which result 
from the specific character of' this religion. The character 
of the peoples who profess this religion is that o~ calmness, 
ge·~tleness and obedience which are considered superior to 
anxious desire and passion. In so far as the stillness 
. 
of Being-within-itself is the extinction of all that is 
particular, is nothingness, this state of annihilation is 
the highest state for man, and his destiny is to immerse 
himself in this non-existence, eternal repose, in nothingness. 
This Will result in a state where all determinations cease 
libid., II, 52. 
2. Ibid .. , II, 58. 
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and where there is no will and no intelligence. 
By persistent immersion and meditation within himself 
man is supposed to become like to this principle, to 
come to be without passion, without, inclination, 
without action, and to arrive at a conditi~n in 
which he desires nothing and does nothing. 
One e again we can see that the matter of sin, salvation 
and immortality have nothing to do with it. Holiness is de-
fined in terms of' the extent to wbich a person succeeds in 
uniting himself in this extinction, in this silence, with 
God, with nothingness, with the Absolute. The complete 
cessation of' all bodily motion and all movement of the 
soul represents the highest state to which a man can aspire •. 
When this state is reached there is no further change f'or 
he beoome s identical with God. It can be seen tba t such a 
conception of the holy lif"e would lead to the formation of 
great religious societies, the members of' which would attempt 
to live in complete repose of' b9dy and mind without mixing 
in any way with the af"f'ai:t>s of' this 11U0rld. If a person 
is able to unite himself' w.t th nothingness and to rid himself 
of' all consciousness, of all passion he achieves the state 
which among Buddhists is cal.led Nirvana. Such a person is 
loosed from some of' the exigencies of this life. He no 
longer is subject to disease or death or to any f'urther 
progression in age; he is looked upon as God Himself'; he 
has, in short, become Buddha. As such, this ttru, this self-
libid., II, 60~ 
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contained existence has become Infinite~ Eternal and Unchang-
ing. This one, as Buddha, has become a particular deter-
mination of Being-within-itself. 
In so far~ however, as a man haw not been able by 
self-renunciation to attain this felicity he is still in 
need.of further bodily existence. This, says Hegel, gave 
rise to the doctrine of metempsychosis.1 The wildest 
superstition has resulted from this belief. "They believe 
that man passes into all possible forms, and that the priests 
are those who, living in the supersensuous world, determine 
the form which the soul is to take on, and are therefore 
able to keep it from assuming ill-omened shapes.'~~2 Hegel 
. -
also maintains that this dogma of metempsychosis accounts 
for the way in which the simple worship of Being-within-
itself degenerates into all forms of' idolatry. All manner 
of birds, beasts and creeping things have temples erected 
to them and are worshipped since every animal body may be 
inhabited by the soul of' man. 3 
With this, Hegel turns to a consideration of' several 
religions which stand midway between the religions of' 
nature on the one hand and the religions o:f spiritual in-
dividuality on the other. 
1 Ibid., II, 64. 
2 Ibid., II, 64. 
3:i:bid., II, 65. 
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The Rela£ion of Nature in transition to the Religion 
of Free m 
Within this category Hegel includes (l) the dualistic 
. -. -· 
religion of the Persians, (2) the religion of pain, that is, 
the Phoenician and Syrian, and (3) the Egyptian religion of 
Enigma. As regards the necessity of this intermediary 
stage in passing from natural religion to the religion of 
freedom Hegel writes that it is ubased upon the fact that 
' -
the truth which in the prededing stages is potentially 
present as the foundation is here actually brought forward 
and posited.nl Hegel is here regerring to the fact that in 
-
the religion of phantasy and of being-within-itself which 
we have briefly examined, our subjective self-consciousness 
is taken, in an immediate manner, as identical with the 
substantial unity which is called Brahm& or characterless 
nothingness. This One was conceived of as a unity determined 
within itself 1'as implicitly subjective unity,n Hegel writes, 
tland at the s~e time as this unity in its chara~ter as im-
plicitly totality. If,~Uhe continues,•fthe unity be inherently 
. -determined as subjective, it then contains the principle of 
Spirituality in itself, and it is this principle which unfolds 
itself in the religions which are based upon this transition.u2 
libid .. , II, 65. 
2" . Ibid., II, 65. 
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Speaking generally, the characteristic common to the 
three religions of this transitional sEage is the resumption 
o:r wild, unrestrained totality into concrete unity. This 
resumption into substantial unity, which is:i:hb.erently sub-
jective, has, however, two forms. The first form of re-
ligion is that seen in the religion of the Persians and it 
takes place, writes Hegel, ttin a pure, simple manneF.nl 
- . 
The other form seen in the Syrian and Egyptian religions is 
•the fermenting process ••• where the fermentation of 
-totality mediates itsel.f into unity, and unity comes into 
existence in the strife of its el.ements.•2 This wil.l become 
clearer as we briefly e.xa.m.ine each of these religions 
separately. 
~)' The Religion ~f the Good or of Light. 
Herodotus and other Greek writers provide us vl th ow:-
earliest information concerning this religion. Zoroaster 
was the fbunder of this religion which flourished among 
the ancient Parsis. It was not until recent times when 
the Frenchman, Anquetil. du Perron discovered the sacred books 
of these people; the Zend-AvestaL that more accurate know-
ledge could be had. 
lrbid., II, 70. 
2. Ibid., II, 70 .. 
93. 
When we turn to the philosophical notion or conception 
of this religion we find that, for the first time, a separation 
takes place between our empirical self-consciousness on the 
one hand and the Absolute or the content of tbe Highest on 
the other. God has at last attained true objectivity. You 
will remember that in the religion of Brahma the empirical 
self-consciousness was immersed in itself and this ~ 
Brahm.a. The objectivity of the Absolute or the conscious-
ness of its independence apart from our self-consciousness 
is not present. But in the religion of the Parsis we begin 
to see God taken as an object over against our subjectivity. 
Hegel writes that ~Here this breach between sub~ ctivity and 
objectivity takes. place for the first time, and it is here 
that objectivity for the first time properly deserves the name 
of' God; and we have this objectivity of God here because 
this content has determined itself' by its own act to be poten-
tially concrete totality.nl 
-People at one and the same time have a conviction that 
subjectivity belongs to religion, that our own self-conscious-
ness forms a part of religion and yet many concurrently hold 
that the spiritual can exist as an empirical object and that 
a natural thing can be taken for God. Hegel repeatedly empha-
sizes the fact that God is a S~it and that this is~ in 
point of fact, 11 the :ta.boolute characteristic quality of religion 
libid., II, 67. 
94. 
in general, and therefore the fundamental characteristic, 
the substantial basis, in every form of religion.u1 At 
. 
last it is not a case that man is God or God is man but 
ra~er that God is truly objective in his ow.n nature. 
That is to say that God is concretely determined in Himself 
and is known as being in his own nature subjective. For 
the first time He stands over against man as an Object. 
Abstractly put, the notion of this religion is expressed 
in the thought that God is known as the absolutely existent, 
which is determined within itself.2 
Here the universal Substance ceases to be Substance 
and begins to be subject. This unity, Hegel tells us, 
as a self-determining unity, has a content and this content 
is called the Good. Now if the Universal be conceived 
as the determination of self within self, then it comes 
into opposition with what is Other than itself. 'Xhus the 
Good oomes into opposition with its Other, the Evil and 
this results in a dualism which issues in strife. When 
this strife is finally overcome Spirit comes to itself and 
freedom is attained. The religions where this struggle is 
ended Hegel calls the religions of spiritual individuality. 
This is to get ahead of ourselves; first let us examine the 
strife more closely. 
libid., II, 67. 
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This Good which is commensurate with Universality itself 
is still abstract. Here it is one-sided, the absolute anti-
thesis of' the Other which is Evil'• Here the ancient Oriental 
dualism--the realms of' good and evil--have reached the level 
of' universal abstraction. This dualism, says Hegel, is of' 
interest both to philosophy and to religion.l It is, in 
fact, only when this dualism is put in terms of Thought that 
the opposition acquires its universality. This is exhibited 
when we take the finite as independent, so that the inf'ini te 
and the finite stand opposite to one another in such a way 
that the infinite has no part with the finite and the finite 
bas nothing to do with the inf'ini te. Evil, then, results 
when the finite in its further dete·rmination asserts itself' 
as over against the infinite and opposed to it. •But God,n 
- -Hegel reminds us, •is only one principle, one power, and the 
-finite, and f'or that very :reason Evil, has no true indepen-
dent existence.•2 
lllb.en we return iD the Good we find that, by virtue of 
its universality, it possesses a natural mode of' existence. 
This natural sensuous existence is Light. Light is, however, 
in conflict w.i. th darkness, that is, with evil, which it is 
to overcome, though ideally, for it never succeeds in doing 
this. Indeed, darkness is necessary to light for without it 
light cannot be manifested. Here light must not be taken 
libid., II, 73. 
2Ibid., II, 74. 
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as meaning the sun for the sun is a particular body. The 
Good, the light is to be taken subjectively as ttthe soul of 
things.nl 
This religion is imperfect in that the gap which is 
created between God and the Other cannot be bridged. Here 
light and darkness, Good and Evil exist side by side. God is 
as yet impotent. He is not able to contain and endure the 
opposition or the contradiction within Himself but has the 
Evil along side of Him. Strife in its objective phase be-
tween Good and Evil has not been over co :me.. We now turn 
to a consideration of strife as no. longer exhibiting an 
external opposition only but as it exists within a single 
subject and within that subject 1 s own feeling of itself. 
b) The Syrian Religion, or the Religion of Pain. 
The Syrian religion is ~eoccupied with the cycle of 
life, death and resurrection. At this stage we are not 
concer.ned with the conflict between Good and ~vil but 
rather with a "divine process which pertains to the nature 
of God Himself, and is the process in one individual. •2 
.Hegel maintains in accord with his famous dialectical 
principle that it is the eternal nature of Spirit to die 
to self, secondly, to render itself finite in Nature, and 
thirdly, by the annulling of its natural existence to return·. 
libid., II, 77 • 
2-Ibid., II, 84. 
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to itsel~. Concerning this Hegel writes, 
This process or course of finitude, of pain, strife, 
victory, is a moment or stage in the nature of Spirit, 
and it cannot be absent in the sphere under considera-
tion, in WhiCh power continuously determines itself 
toward spiritual freedom. The loss of onets own self, 
the contradiction between sel~-contained Being and 
its 110ther, 1f a contradiction which annuls itsel~ by 
abso~ption in to infinite unity-for here we can think 
o~ true infinitude only--the annulling o~ the opposition, 
these are the essential determinations in the Idea of 
Spirit which now make their appearance.l 
Hegel observes that this process has acquired a definite 
form in the religions of anterior Asis generally and especially 
in the religion of the Phoenicians~ The Phoenician myth of 
- •. 
the Phoenix, the myth of Adonis among the Greeks and the 
myth of Castor and ~~1lux are specific determinations of the 
process which we have mentioned in which the succumbing to 
death, the estrangement of the god from himself and his 
resurrection are brought into special pPominence. Hence 
it is that the essential moment of truth to be .found in 
these religions is »the transition generally from life, from 
-
af.firmative Being, m death, to negation, and then again the 
rising up out of this negationn2 which co~itutes a necessary 
--stage in the development o.f Spirit. From this we pass to 
the ultimate determination of natural religion and the stage 
Which constitutes the transition to the religion of free 
subjectivity. 
libid., II, 83. 
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c) The Religion of Mystery. 
Hegel begins his discussion of the Egyptian religion 
of Enigma by remind us ~at nit is the essential nature 
-
of subjectivity iD unite opposite principles within itself, 
to be the force or energy which is able to endure this 
contradiction, and to dissolve it within itself.ul In 
~ 
the religi. on of' the Persis light and darkness stood over 
against one another in an eternal dualism~ At this present 
stage at which we have now arrived we begin to see the 
dualism of light and darkness resolve itself into a unity 
in such a way that this dark~ this negative element is 
included within subjectivity itself. We begin to see, 
because as yet we are only in the transition to subjectivity; 
absolute freedom has not yet been fully attained. From 
,. 
one point of view subjectivity does indeed unite everything; 
and yet since'it is as yet immature the Other is left 
outside of it. Hegel writes, 
In reference to the nature of the form in which Spirit 
bas its self-consciousness concerning itself as the 
object of its consciousness, the stage now before us 
presents itself as the transition from the earlier forms 
to the higher stage of religion. Subjectivity does not 
as yet exist on its own account or for itself, and is 
consequently not yet free, but it is the middle point 
between substance and free subjectivity.2 
libid •. , II, 86. 
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The result of' this entanglement between the higher 
stage of' religion with which we are now concerned and the 
religion of' nature as well as the defect Which results :from 
the intermixture of substantial unity and subjectivity is 
to involve ~is new determination in all manner of' inconsis-
tencies. That is why Hegel refers to this religion as the 
religion of myster,r or enigma. Accordingly, write Hegel, 
there is here merely what is mysterious and confused, 
and by m. ana of' the Notion alone can the clue be obtained 
Whidi indicates to Which side such heterogeneous ele-
ments tend to come together, and to1which of' the two sides the pr;>incipall moments belong. 
In this religion .we have God as subjectivity generally, 
but with the important di. :ff"erence that negation is not 
:found outside the subject but wi~~ it. There is one subject 
and the negative moment is death. God becomes al·ienated ·from 
himself, loses himself in death, but through this loss he 
:finds himself again and returns to himself. It is one and 
the same subject which passes through all these determina-
tiona .. 
Here, for the first time, we have the death of' the god 
as something within himself, implying that the negation 
is immanent in his essential nature, in his very self, 
and it is precisely owing to this that'this god is 
essentially Characterised as Subject.2 
When we considered the first step of the objective 
attitude, the step to Brahma, we observed that in Him no 
libid., II, 94. 
2I.bid., II, 99. 
This universal moti£ of death and resurrection is 
liberally embellished with an infinite variety of pop-
ularly conceived deities. Particular seasons of the 
year including the vernal equinox, the early summer, 
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and the like, are brought into prominence and personif'ied 
in the deities of' the calendar. In the Egyptian religion 
God is not yet known as Spirit, but rather as power in 
general, and this power is thought to be unconscious acti v-
i ty-universal lif'e. The signif'icance which Hegel f'inds 
in Egyptian enigma and symbolism lies in the f'act that 
the external f'onns of their religion fUnction as signs 
by :means o£ which something which has not been yet 
openly expressed is indicated. 
At this stage in our enquiry the determinate existence 
of God as God is not existence posited by Hiw~elf', but 
by what is Other, in the particular case of Egyptian re-
ligion-the Nile, tbe Sun et cetera. God is here determined 
as object in a sensuou~ly visible mode. On this level, 
writes Hegel, "Spirit is still in a state of fermentation, 
and still has the drawback of a want of clearness.,nl It 
is in the Greek and Jewish religion, in the former in art 
- " 
and the beautiful human form, and in the latter in objective 
thought, that this clearness is at last attained. 
The enigma is solved; the Egyptian Sphinx, was 
slain by a Greek, and thus the enigma has been 
libid., II, 114. 
solved. rrhis means that the content is ma.n, free 
self-knowing Spirit.l 
B. The Religion of Spiritual Individuality 
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The essential moment of the sphere of spiritual 
individuality at whiCh we have presently arrived is the 
absolutely free power of self-determination. God as 
subject manifests Himself, acts, which means that He 
comes forward into actual existence, into reality. This 
universal Power, Which now shows itself active in the 
form of self-determination, Hegel suggests we call Wisdom.2 
Determination in accordance with an end is directly involved 
in the conception of free subjectivity. 
In so far as we have to do with spiritual subjectivity 
we have to do with self-determination, with an end, and 
these are as universal as the Power, and are thus wise 
ends •• ~ Action which is in accordance with an end is 
inner self-determination, i.e., it is determination by 
means of freedom, by means of the subject, 5or there is 
nothing within but just the subject itself. 
As to God's ways, His ends, we as yet know nothing 
save that so far we have self-determination in accordance with 
ends in general. At this point Hegel raises two questions: 
first, What is the-sphere in Which this end can be present?4 
He answers this question by reminding us that ends are internal 
and subjective and exist in the form of thoughts or ideas. 
1Ibid., II, 122. 
2ibid., 
.. 
II, 127. 
3ibid., II, 127. 
4. Ibid .. , II, 129. 
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The sphere of the realization of the actual existence of the 
end is self-consciousness or the finite spirit. And secondly, 
he asks What is the exact nature of these ends?l At this 
point,.he answers, that these ends which e*press the self-de-
termination of God are only potential.. What remains is that the 
necessity of their actual realization be shown. They must be 
exhibited as a necessary determination in the notion of God. 
Hegel maintains that we are able to recognize this 
emergence of free subjectivity in religions and in the 
peoples to Which such religions belong, principally by 
observing whether among such peoples nuniversal laws, laws 
-
of freedom, justice, and morality, constitute fundamental 
detenninations and have the predominance.n2 
v.:. 
God conceived of as subject is conceived of as 
spontaneously determining himself, i.e., His self-
determinations are the laws of freedom; they are the 
determinations of self-determination, and are of 
such a kind that their content belongs only to the form 
of free self-determination, and with this is necessarily 
connected the fact that freedom constitutes the content 
of the laws.3 
The chief deficiency of those religions Which Hegel 
denominated the "Religions of Nature• was seen to be the 
- -inadequacy of what is immediately external to express what 
is internal. The Infinite, it will be remembered, was 
absolute negativity, undeveloped Power, and the thought 
involved in the first sphere and its essence ~as limited to 
this definition of infinitude. In reference to this stage 
. 
itself, the Essence w~s defined simply as the Infinite and 
libid., II, 130. 
2ibid., II, 124 
3Ibid., II, 124. 
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required natural existence in order to show itself in a 
definite actual shape. In contrast to this, we now have the 
Essence itself' defined as "the unity of the Infinite and the 
~ 
finite, as true Power, as infinitude which.is concrete in 
itself, i.e., as the unity of the finite and the Infinite.u1 
-
In order to be it does not have recourse to natural objects, 
flbut has a determinate character of its own within itself, 
and is the totality of its appearance or semblance.u2 
.. 
What we now have marks an advance in the metaphysical 
notion itself since the determination of pure thought is 
now taken as a characterization of the Essence itself and 
is not connected with the natural mode or aspect of th~ngs. 
fiAt an earlier stage,~ Hegel writes, ~the advance was 
- - -
merely in the external form, here the advance is within 
the notion itself.u3 As a consequence, Hegel finds three 
-
conceptions within the Divine Essence which are its own 
.. ~ 
reflections of itself into itself. These are: Unity, Necessity, 
and Conformability to an End. 4 By Unity, Hegel is speaking 
of' this Absolute Power which is posited as reflected into 
itself, as existing absolutely for self, or as absolute sub-
jectivity completely divorced from anything sensory. Such 
libid., II, 132. 
2Ibid., II, 132. 
3' .. Ibid., II, 133. 
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a conception of the One as yet takes no account of activity 
or development. Necessity, then, for Regel, enters at this 
point--it comes to be the process of unity itself. aThe move-
ment which constitutes the Notion is the unity, the absolute 
necessity.ftl In necessity it is the coming and going of 
-things which is posited in such a manner that "these things 
-
exist and appear as distinguished from ~is unity of theirs, 
.from this process. of' necessity which belongs to them. n& Sim-
ilarly, 
This is the unity of' necessity itself', but thought 
of as distinguished from what moves itself', and 
within which it maintains itself, so that it has the 
element of Being only a~ something negative. Unity 
is thus End in general.3'·-. 
This, then is what Hegel means by ttcon.formability to an End,~ 
-
though it should be recognized that this con.for.mability 
is of a finite and external sort.. Concerning the relation-
ship which ehse three points bear to one another, Hegel 
writes: 
Since the Essence is absolute·negativity, it is pwe 
identity with itself, the One; it is at the same 
time the negativity of the_unity, which, however, 
is in a relation:to the unity, and owing to this 
interpenetration of both shows itself as necessity. 
In the third place, the One returns into itself 
out of' the isolation of its diff'e!'ence, a unity, 
nevertheless, which, as being this self-abso!'ption 
o:f the Form into itself, has a finite content, and 
in this way, by developing :t.nto the· diff'e!'ence of 
the Fo!'m as totality, gives us the conception of 
libid., II, 134. 
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conformability to an end1 a conformability which is1 
however 1 finite.l 
If this doctrine seems obscure at this point, its 
meaning will become clearer forthwith as we examine the 
three religions which belong to the sphere of spiritual 
individuality. Indeed, Hegel maintains that the meta-
physical notions or conceptions of these religions are 
implicitly to be found in this doctrine of Unity, Nec-
essity and Gonformability to an End. It is not to be 
supposed, however, that each of these conceptions belongs 
to one religion only. non the contrary,n writes Hegel, 
- ~ 
treach of these three determinations or characteristics 
belongs to all three.n2 What we must determine now is 
- "-
which of these conceptions is to pass as the fundamental 
determination of the Essence of each religion. In 
external existence these three moments are represented 
by the Jewish, the Greek, and the Roman religions. 
Let us turn to the first of these, the religion of the 
Jews Which Hegel calls the Religion of Sublimity. 
-'-" 
1. The R~ligion of Sublimity. 
At this stage free subjectivity is elevated to 
the condition of pure Thought and is completely divorced 
from sense. nThe natural or immediate element is in 
it nega.ted; . it is only for Spirit, for Thought. tJ3. Pure 
- . -Thought is· a form which is more adequate to express the 
content of free subjectivity than the sensuous is. 
. -~ libid., rr, 134 • 
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Indeed, it is this transcendence of Spirit over .the 
natural and the finite that gave rise to the appelation--
the Religion of Sublimity. 
It is this free subjective unity which for the first 
time deserves to be called God. This subjective unity 
~s not a substance; it is absolute Power Which finds its 
definite existence or manifestation in Thought • 
• The region for tbe play of this manifestation of 
reason, mich, as subjectivity, is, so far as its 
content is concerned, universal, and is, so far 
as its form is concerned, free-the region in which 
pure subjectivity Shows itself, is that of pure 
Thought. This pure subjectivity has been freed 
from the natural, and consequently from what is 
sensuous, whether this is found in the external 
world of sense or is a sensuous idea. It is the 
spiritual subjective unity, and it is this which 
f~rst rightly gets from us the name of God.l 
We have now reached, to use our modern terminology, 
the appearance of the idea of a personal God.. In the 
religions with which we are now going to conern ourselves, 
God, or the gods as the case may be, are no longer merely 
substance, but bave become subject or spirit. The divinities 
of the former religions Which we have studied--Siva, Ormazd, 
Osiris, Adonis, are not really persons but only superficial 
personifications of abstract principles such as the Good, 
Change, Creation and Destruction. The full meaning of this 
- . 
progression from substance to spirit will not be completely 
understood until we reach Christianity. 
1~., II, 17J.. 
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In fue religions in 'Which God is conceived as Sub-
stance all particularity and all finitude including the 
human spirit exist as mere accidents with no right of 
independent existence apart from substance. This is not 
. the case with the religion of' spiritual individuality. Here, 
God is spirit. And it is the very nature of spirit to 
allow the particular to go forth out of' itself in free 
independent existence. Hence the finite and particular 
mind has, in these religions, a definite right to exist 
on its own account, and is free. Stace summarizes the 
important implications of this advance from substance ro 
spirit when he says that, as a result of this advance 
the religious life i~ no longer conceived as 
withdrawal from the world, asceticism, absorption 
in ~e One, but rather as the active life of moral-
ity, life in the state, etc. For morality and the 
laws of the stat.e are the laws .,of freedom, and the 
product of the free spiri t.l · 
It is interesting to note that in his philosophy of 
art, Hegel places the Jewish conceptions along with Hindu 
and Egyptian art, in the sphere of oriental symbolism 
whereas in his philosophy of religion Judaism is intro-
duced here as the first determination of the religion of 
spiritual individualitY. If any parallels were to be 
drawn between the spheres of' art and religion they would 
fall somewhat as follows: symbolic art roughly corresponds 
• 
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to the religion of nature and the religions of spiritual 
individuality correspond with the sphere of classical art. 
This lack of consistency in treatment may me an nothing more 
than the f'act that tm art and religion of' the Jews stand at 
different levels of development in their respect·ive spheres~ 
or it may testify to the hybrid character of Judaism •. 
Whatever may be the answer to this particular problem~ we 
may be fairly sure that the reason that Judaism appears 
as a determination of the religion of' spiritual individual-
ity is because of its f'undamental notion that God is a 
person. 
To Jehovah alone absolute independent reality is 
ascribed and the particular has no independent existence 
apart from Him andyet it cannot be said to be a part of 
Him in any way •. Nevertheless, for Hegel the universal 
must, in some shape or other produce the particular out 
of itself. This production of the particular is the 
Jewish Cb ctrine o.f the creation of tb.e world. Concerning 
this, Hegel writes: 
This particularisation is, to begin with, the 
Divine act of characterisation in general, and is 
thus Creation. This positing of the world is not 
transitory, but,.on the contrary, what proceeds 
out of God preserves the character of something 
posited., of the creature, in fact. Thus what is 
created has upon it the mark of' something which 
has no independence. This is the fundamental 
characteristic, and one which remains attached to 
it because God is conceived of as Subject, as 
infinite Power .1 
We must be careful not to confuse the correct 
lHegel, Lectures· on the Philosophy of Religion, II, 1'78. 
understanding of the t~ue nature of creation with the 
vague popular conception which readily suggests the 
mechanical and technical methods of production used by 
man. ttThis,n writes Hegel, •is an. idea which we must 
keep out of ;ur minds.nl -Human production, technical 
- . 
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production, is an external process whereas God's creative 
activity is, to use Hegel's words, "intuitive production.•2 
. - - ~ 
11It is an inward act,. inner activity, which as no ~ef'erence 
to something actually existing. It is life-force, the 
. 
eternal production of Nature, and Nature, speaking generally, 
is something posited, something created.n3 
In the relationship between God and the world at this 
stage we see a remnant of the religions of substance. Fo~ 
the world thus created is a nullity, has no right to exist. 
It is the !'esult of God's grace that the world does exist. 
~ 
Goodness consists in the fact that the world is: 
Being does not belong to it, as Being is here rE?duced 
to the condition of a moment, and is only a Being 
WhiCh has been posited or created. This act_ of 
dividing, of' differentiation, represents the eternal 
goodness of God. What· is thus distinguished from 
God has no .ri.ght tg. be; it is external to the One, 
something manifold, and because of this, something 
limited, finite, whose essential character is not 
to be, but the gpodness of God consists just in the 
fact that it is. Inasmuch as it is something. which 
has been posited• it also passes away, is only appear-
ance. God only is Being, the truly real; Being which 
excludes any of its. elements, Being outside of God, 
bas no right of existence.4 · . 
Since it is the function of spirit to act in accord-
. libid., II, 1:118 J. ·;·2 Gl 
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ance with ends., it is both proper and necessary that we 
should ask What is the end which God seeks to work out 
in the mrld: For J"udaism God is the sole reality and 
tne»efore no finite end could be considered. 
The determination of' the end .appears here as the 
essential one that God is wise, to begin with-
wise in Nature generally. Nature is His creature, 
and He lets His power be known in it, though not · 
His power only, but His wisdom as well. This 
wisdom reveaJ.s itself' in what it produces.by the 
pPesence of' arrangement in accordance with an end.l 
God's end, then,. can be nothing but Himself. All things 
--
are for the glory of God. The innumerable host of lessor 
endsswhich we may uncover can all be subsumed under this 
one end. 
On the part of' man a recognition o:r the fact that 
all things were created for His glory also involves a 
recognition of' his own worthlessness. God is the Lord 
and our duty is to serve Him and to fear Him. 
. -
Finally, it should be mentioned that since God is 
spirit He does not exist in any external sensuous f'orm. 
There is no image of Him. Indeed,. all images are re-
. 
garded as abominations. «He does not exist,n Hegel writes, 
for the sensuous idea, but, on the contrar,r, He exists only 
for thought.v2 
We shall not pass to tbe second determination o:r the 
libid .. , II, 189. 
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religion of spiritual individuality, the Greek religion, 
or the religion of beauty. 
2. The Religion of Beauty. 
The Religion of Beauty finds its specific determina-
tion in the religion of the Greeks, which, as Hegel writes, 
"both in its inner and outer aspects, presents us with an 
infinite amount of inexhaustible material.nl The Greek 
religion is the religion of humanity and freedom. The 
one God of the Hebrews is here broken up into a multi-
plicity of gp ds. These gods are genuine persons and not 
mere personifications of abstract principles. We see, says 
HegelJ "the Human existing in God under what are still 
natural ~conditions.n2 This human element in God places 
the religion of the Greeks in the class of finite religions. 
In the religion of the Jews l9od was characterized fo!' 
thought as substantial Power, and-as the Creator, but in 
this character He is merely the Lord of His creatures 
and He negates their freedom and independence. In the 
new stage whiCh we have no reached God becomes the. God 
of free men, who, while rendering Him obedience, are 
actuily free in their relation to Him. This standpoint, 
libid .. , II, 224. 
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if' we look at it in an abstract way, contains within it 
the f'ollowing mements as they are expressed in Hegelfs 
Bbd is a f'ree~ absolute Spirit, and manif'ests 
Himself' by setting His "Other0 over against Him-
self'- What is thus. posited by Him is His image, for 
the subject creates only itself', and that which it 
becomes by self'-determination is again nothing 
else than itself'. But in order that it may be 
really determined, or get a specific nature as 
Spirit, it must negate this 110ther, 11 and return to 
itself, f'or then only when it knows _it self' in the · 
"other" is it f'ree. But if God knows Himself in the 
!Other,~ it f'o1lows that the "Other" has an actual 
independent exi stance, is for .. it self, and knows 
itself to be free.l 
Man, then, as an essential manifestation of' God, bas 
the right of independent existence and is no longer merely 
negated by God. If' we contrast this with the .Jewish re-
ligion-, or, as Hegel calls it, the religion of sublimity, 
we see at once tbat God is in nature.. Since God manifests 
Himself, as we have said above, by setting His nothern 
- .. 
over against Himself', it fbllows that the nothern is itsel~ 
- . 
part of' God, is divine. Hence, D.a ture, is not, accord-
ing to this higher standpoint, absolutely negated and 
"WOrthless. It would seem, then, that the conception of' 
God Him.s elf bas undergone little change in the progression 
.from the .Jewish religion to the Greek religion, but that 
the change is only in the aspect in which the nothern is 
lrbid., II, 220. 
regarded. Another contrast worth pointing out is seen 
in the fact that for the Greeks the gods are friendly 
beings, fellow inhabitants in the world. In Judaism, 
on the other hand, man was commanded to hold his God 
in fear and awe. Finite man fled from before the eyes 
of' the Holy God. 
The new spirit manifested in the Greek religion 
can be expressed thus; 
Man recognizes himself in God and God and man 
say of' each other--That is spirit of my spirit. 
Man is Spirit just ~s God is Spirit. He has 
also, it is true, finitude ang the element of 
separation in him, but in religion he discards 
114. 
his finitude since his knowledge is the knowledge of 
himself' in God.l 
This affirmative relationship between the subject and 
his gods is characterized by happiness. flThis religion 
has, speaking generally, the character of' absolute 
joyousness.n2 The worship which arises from this joyous 
- . 
freedom is represented in festivals, games, plays, songs, 
and works of' art. Consider this significant passage: 
Now since the ria tion in the productions of' art, 
in the honour paid in sdngs and festivals, allows 
the idea of the divine to appear in itself, it has 
its worship in itself, i.e., directly shows what 
is really its own excellence; it shows the best 
it has, that which it has been capable of making 
itself. Men adorn themselves; pageantry, dress, 
adornment, dance, song, battle--all are connected 
\'ITith the desire to show honour to the gods. Man 
libid., ;r:r, 224. 
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shows his spiritual and bodily ability and skill, 
his riches; he exhibits himself in all the glory of 
God, and ~us enjoys the manifestation of God in 
the individual himself. This characterises festi-
vals even yeto This general description may suffice 
to show that man allows the idea of the gods to 
appear to him through himself, and that he r epre-
sents himself in the most splendid possible way, and 
thus shows his reverential recognition of the gods.l 
From this passage· we can see why Hegel called the 
-
Greek religion the religion of beauty. For it follows 
that the more beautiful the form given to the gods, in 
the images, stories, and local representations connected 
with them, t~e more perfect is the expression of the 
essence of their religious conceptions. 
With this we pass to the final stage in the re-
ligions of spiritual individuality~the Roman Religion, or 
as Hegel otherwise calls it.:r the Religion of Utility. 
3. The Relig;ton o:f Utility or. of the Understanding. 
At the very outset of his discussion of the Religion 
of Utility, Hegel warns us against identifying the Roman 
religion with the Greek religion. T~ere are, it is true, 
certain superficial similarities, but the spirit of the 
one is essentially different from that of the other. «:Even 
if they possess certain outward forms .in common, 0 Hegel 
-points out, 1tstill these occupy quite a different place 
ll!bid.,, II, 2?3. 
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in the religion we are dealing with; and the religions as 
a mole~ and the religious sentiment corme cted with them, 
are essentially different, as isjndeed already evident 
from an external, superficial, and empirical examination 
of them.nl 
-Looked at in a general way, the particular Roman 
deities, or at least many of them, are the same as the 
Greek. Yet, Hegel tells us, they lack the beautiful 
free individuality of the Greek gods-nthey seem to be 
~ 
grey, so to speak.tt2 They appear like machines with 
-nothing spi~itual in them. The distinctive thing about 
the Roman gods is not their beauty but rather their use-
fulness. The divine beings belonging to this religion are 
practical and not theoretical gods; prosaic and not in 
the laast poetical. 
The Roman religion stands as the synthesms of the 
two ~eceding religions, it presents a higher unity. 
It constitutes, when viewed according to its inner sig-
nificance, the closing stage of the finite religions. 
One of the most important characteristics of the sphere 
Which Hegel calls the Religions of Spiritual Individuality 
is found in the fact that God (or the gods, a~ the case 
may be) is necessarily conceived as acting in accordance 
libid., II, ros. 
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with ends. In the religion of Israel, Jehovah could have 
no other end than Himself. flThis end consisting, as it 
does, in the glorification of the name of God, is formal, 
it has no absolutely definite character, but is only· 
abstract manifestation1l The Greek gpds, on the other 
hand, had a multiplicity of ends commensurate with their 
finite and human character. 
In the Roman religion we see a combination of the 
single universal and characteristic of the Jewiffil faith 
with the particular finite ends of the Greek gods. What 
we find as a result is the appearance of an end, which 
.although it is finite and actulally present, is at the 
same time universal in its nature. This end, accordingly, 
is the State. 
What is intended here is not a conception o.f the 
State as a rationally articulated organization, but rather 
as a universaL power bringing all peoples within the 
scope o.f its sovereigntyu 
The State, however, as representing this end is, to 
begin with, only the abstraDt State--the union of 
men held together by some bond~ but in such a way 
that this union is not yet in itself in the .form of 
a rational organisation, and it does not yet take 
this form because God is not yet a rational organ-
isation in Himself• ••• This end, namely, the State, 
is not yet a rational totality in itself, and does not 
therefore deserve the name State, but is merely a 
kind of dominion or sovereignty, the union of indivi-
118. 
duals~ of peoples, held together by some bond under 
one Power.l 
Since the universal end is the power and dominion of tbe 
state, it is not to be wondered at that the Emperor came 
to be worshiped as a go d. 
We have pointed out the principal features of the 
Roman religion~ the Religion of Utility. There are con-
tained in it moments, Hegel tells us, the union of which 
constit~s ~e essential character of the next and last 
stage of religion--the stage of Absolute religion. nThe 
-· ·-
moments ~ich are isolated in the religion of outward 
utility, but which are related to each other, and conse-
quently are in a condition of contradiction, are, though 
present here in an unspiritual form, the moments out of 
which, when united according to their true nature, arises 
the essential characteristic of the Religion of Spirit. 11 2 
-It is in this respect that the Roman world represents the 
important point ~ depart for the Christian religion, the 
»indespensable middle termn, as Hegel calls it.3 In 
- - . .. 
Chapter Six we shall discuss the final stage of religion-
the Absoiute religion. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 
At the very beginning of' Part III of' his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion Hegel br~ef'ly sets forth the 
metaphysics of' the Absolute Religion. This is followed by 
an exposition of his speculative view of' Christianity in 
which he seeks to demonstrate the fact that Christianity 
. . 
is, in fact, the historical, positive form of the Absolute 
Religion. 
The Metapnysics of the Absolute Religion 
"We have now reached,,.. Hegel asserts, :ttthe realized 
notion or conception of religion, the perfect religion, in 
which it is the notion itself' that is its own object.n1 
The perfect idea that God is Spirit constitutes the content 
of' religion and at last it is fully realized. We have 
seen in the positive (pre-Christian) religions how this 
cognition of God as free Spirit was still burdened with 
finite limitations. It was the work of' Spirit to overcome 
these limitations. Still the nugatory character of these 
limitationm~helped to give subjective preparation for the 
consciousness of Spirit as absolutely free and therefore 
1Regel, Lectures on the Philosophy of' Religion, 
II, 327. 
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definite. 
Hegel rirst points out three general characteristics 
o.f this stage. (l) The Absolute Religion is the revealed 
religion. (2) Not only is it the revealed religion~ but 
the religion: which is actually known as a religion which 
has been revealed; and by this is understood, on the one 
hand., that it has been revealed by God, that God has actually 
communicated the knowledge o.f Himself to men; and~ on the 
- -
other hand, that being a revealed religion, it is a revealed 
religion in the sense that it has come to men, and has been 
given to them .from the outside. (3) The Absolute Religion 
is the religion of Truth and Freedom. 
By the term revealed religion, Hegel does not understand 
an external body of divinity which is presented directly 
to our consciousness by God. Instead, in revealed religion 
spirit is the reality whi~h exists .for spirit and which 
has spirit .for its object. Less abstractly put, Hegel is 
appealing to the .facts of consciousness. Our conscious 
experience, he explains, reveals two elements--conscious-
ness and the object or objects of consciousness. These 
two are external to each other and therefore .finite. But 
if religion comprehends itself, then the content and the 
object of religion are themselves the totality; that is, 
it is consciousness related to its own essence, the cogni-
tion of essence as itself~ and not as another. Thus Spirit is 
e· 
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the object of religion. In it there are no longer two--
consciousness and its object--but one; that is, religion 
which is f'illed with itself, which is revealed. Hegel 
summarizes the matter in the f'ollowing way. 
When, however, as is the case at this stage, religion 
comes to have a true comprehension of itself, then it 
is seen that the content and the object of' religion 
are made up of' this very whole, of the consciousness 
which brings itself into relation with its Essence, 
the knowledge of itself·as the Essence and of the 
Essence as itself, i.e., Spirit thus becomes the object 
in religion. We thus have two things, consciousne·ss 
and the object; in the .... religion, however,· the f'ulness · 
·of which is the f'ulneS::S of' its ·own nature, in the re- · 
vealed religion, the religion which 4emprehel).ds itself'; 
it is religion,· the content itself' wb.·ich is the object, 
and this object, narr$ly, the Essence which knows 
itself, is Spirit. Here first is Spirit as such 
the object, the· content of' religion, and Spirit is 
only f'or Spirit. Since it is content and object, 
as Spirit it is what knows itself', what distinguishes 
· itself f'rom itself', and itself' snpplies the other 
side of' subjective consciousness, that which appears 
as finite. It is the religion which derives its 
f'ulness from. its~lf', which is complete in i tself· .. 1 
·Hegel goes on to identify this perfect religion with 
Christianity. In this religion the universal and the indi-
vidual spirit, the finite and the infinite are inse~arably 
fused together. urt is their absolute identity," Hegel 
-
continues, •which_constitutes this religion and is its sub-
stance or content.n2 ·As one would expect, Hegel rejects 
much ordinary theology which has for its aim the cognition 
libid., II, 329. 
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of God as something purely objective and absolutely separate 
from the subjective consciousness. •In contrast to this~• 
he writes, flthe Notion of the absolute religion can be so 
~resented as to suggest that what we have got to do w2th is 
not anything of this external sort, but religion itself, 
i.e., the unity of this idea which we call God with the 
conscious subject. ttl 
The second general characteristic of the Absolute Re-
ligion is that it is a positive .religion in the sense that 
it has come to men~ and has been given to them from the 
outside. ttTb.e absolute religion is undoubtedly a positive 
religion in the sense that everything which exists for 
consciousness is for it something_objective. Everything 
must come to us in an outward way.•2 The things of sense 
are positive, indee~, he adds, •there is nothing so positive 
as what we have before us in i.nnD.ediate perception. 113 Every-
thing spiritual comes to us in this way also, as the spiritual 
in a finite f'orm, the spiri tu.a.l in the form of' history, and 
the mode in which the spiritual is thus external and exter-
nalizes itself' is likewise positive. 
The positive element in religion is found in •a11 that 
constitutes its doctrines.•4 But, Hegel goes on, •it is not 
meant to remain in this condition, or to be a matter of' 
lroid~, II, 330. 
2Ibid., II, 336. 
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mere popular ideas or of pure memory.ul In his speculative 
treatment of the doctrines of Christianity Hegel exhibits 
them in What he· considers to be their highest formo 
He next considers the positive element connected with 
the verification of religion. This consists in the idea 
tba t what is external should establish the truth of' a. religion, 
and should be regarded as the foundation of' its truth. Here 
in this instance the verification takes the form of some-
thing positive as such, that is, miracles and evidences of' 
this sort. It is held that miracles prove the divinity of' 
the person who reveals and prove that this person has 
communicated to men certain definite doctrines. With 
respect to this Hegel remarks ·nthat it undoubtedly can 
produce a kind of verification for the man who is guided by 
his senses; but this is merely the beginning of verification, 
an unspiritual kin~ of verification by which what is spiritual 
cannot be verif'ied.•2 He cites two examples in support of' 
his view. Moses perf'ormed miracles before Pharaoh, and the 
Egyptian sorcerers imitated them, and this implied that 
no great value was to be put on them. Then too, desus 
himself' said, "Many will come who will do miracles in My 
name, but I know them not.u3 By this statement, Hegel main-
tains, desus was rejecting miracles as a true criterion of 
truth. 
1Ibid., II, 337. 
2:i:bid., II, 338. 
3Holy Bible, Matt. 24:5. 
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The witness o:f the spirit is the true witness. This 
witness, Hegel tells us, may take various forms; it may be 
indefinite, general, something which is, broadly speaking, 
in harmon¥ with Spirit, and which awakens a deeper response 
within it. "In histo~ all that is noble, lofty, moral, 
divine, appeals to us; our spirit bears witness to it. The 
witness may not be more than this general response, this 
assent of the inner li:fe, this sympathy.ul 
But the witness may a1 so be united to intellectual 
grasp, 'lD thought. It appears in the form of reasons, 
distinctions, in the :form of mental activity, exerc~sed 
along with and.according to the specific forms of thought, 
the categories. In this capacity uit may have the character 
o:f something which constitutes the necess~ basis of a 
manta inner beart-li:fe, of his spiritual li:fe in general, 
the presupposition of general fundamental principles which 
have authoritative value for him and accompany him through 
li:fe .•2 These maxims may never rise to the level of con-
- . 
sciousness, nevertheless fithey represent the mode and manner 
-
in which his character is :formed, the universal element 
which has got a :firm :footing in his spirit, and which ac-
corc:lingly is some thing permanent within his mind and governs 
him.~3 The highest need of the human spirit, howevelb, .is 
libid~, II, 3Z9. 
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thought-the witness of the Spirit, which is not present 
only in the marly responsive form of a kind of primary 
sympathy, nor in that other form according to which such 
.t'irm. foundations and fundamental principles exist in the 
spirit. It follows then that the witness of' the Spirit 
in its hig};lest form takes the form of' philosophy, "'accord-
ing to 'Vttich the Notion!' purely as such, and without the 
presence of' any presupposition, de~ops the truth out of' 
itself', and we recognise it as developing, and perceive 
the necessity o:r the development in and through the develop-
ment itself'.ttl 
Hegel does recognize !I however, that we have no right 
to demand that the truth should in the case of' all men be 
got at in a philoso~hical way. The spiritual necessities 
of men var.y so considerably according to their culture and 
free development that even the conviction that we should 
believe on authority, varies according to the different 
stages of development reached. 
Hegel insists that there is something positive present 
in this .t'orm of the witness of the Spirit as well. Sympathy, 
which is immediate certainty, is itself' something positive 
in virtue of' its immediacy, and the process of' in.t'erence 
which starts from something laid down or given has a s im.ilar 
basis. Hegel invites us to reflect upon the fact that 
it is man only who has a religion, and religion has its 
seat and soil in thought as including "'b.eart11 andfhpirit. 111 
• 
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Heru:t or :reeling is not the heart or .felling o.f an 
animal, but the heart o.f thinking man, a thinking 
heart, or :reeling; and what· shows itself in the heart 
as the .feeling for religion, exists in the thinking 
element or the heart, or feeling.l 
In ~esparation fbr his own speculative treatment of 
the essential doctrines of Christianity, Hegel deals 
with the importance o:r the Bible in the Christian religion. 
He :rirst o.f all observes that inasmuch as the doctrines o:r 
. the Christian religion are :round in the Bible, they are 
given in a positive way; and if' they become subjective, 
. . 
if' the Spirit bears witness to their truth, this can 
happen only in a pu.rely im.ne diate way, by a man r s inner 
nature, his spirit, his thought, his_reason being impressed 
with their truth and assenting to it. flThus, for the Christian 
it is the Bible which is this basis, the .fundamental basis, 
and ~ich has upon him the e.ffect re.ferred to, which touches 
a chord in his heart, and gives :tirmness to his convictions.n2 
Thinking man, however, cannot simply rest in this state 
o:r illllll6diate consent or witnessing to truth, but rather he 
turns it over by thinking, meditating, and reflecting upon 
it. "This accordingly leads to a :L'urther development in 
religion; and in its highest and most developed form it 
is theology, scienti.fic religion; it is this content of 
religion known in a scienti:tic way as the witness of Spirit.n3 
libid.~ II, 340. 
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Hegel points out that as soon as theology ceases to be a 
reba arsa1 of mat i_s in the Bible, and goes beyond the words 
o:f the Bible, and concerns itself with the character o:f 
the :feelings within the_heart, it employs :forms o:f thought 
and passes into thought. It is, accordingly, the exam-
ination o:f these :forms o:f ~ought which alone makes philoso-
phy. 
Hegel rejects as a delusion the conviction on the part 
of some theolo~ians that they approach the Bible ~ a merely 
receptive way. We must remember that we bring with us a 
concrete spirit, a thinking, reflecting, or feel~ spirit, 
as we approach the Scriptures. vThe act of apprehending or 
-
:forming a conception is not a wassive reception of something 
. . -
into the mind, but, on the contrary, just because the spirit 
forms a conception, this conceiving o:f so~ething is at the 
same time a manifestation of its activity.~l The main thing 
to remember here uis that Spirit occupies a thinking rela-
tion to things, that it appears in an active form in the 
categories or specific forms of thought, that Spirit is 
active here and may take the shape of feeling, reasoning, etc.•2 
In treating Christianity Regel proposes that we start 
from the Notion rather than to work historically after the 
fashion of that fonn. of: mental action which starts from 
what is outward. 
libid~, II, 344. 
--~ 
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Our attitude ·~re is essentially an attitude of' activi_py 
of' this kind; we are, in f'act, conscious that we are 
thinking on thought itself', on the course taken by 
the categories of' thought, a kind of' thinking 'Which has 
tested· itself' and knows itself, which knows how it 
thinks, and knows micb. are the finite and which the 
true categories of' thought. That, ·regarding the matter 
f'rom the other point of' view, i.e .. the historical we 
start f'romwhat is ~ositive, is true in reference to 
education, and is even necessary; but here we must 
abandon this mode of' Procedure in so f'ar as we employ 
the scientific method.l 
The third general characteristic which Hegel finds in 
the Absolute religion is that it is the religion of truth 
and freedom. For truth mans that the mind does not take 
up such an attitude to the objective as would imply that 
this is oomething :foreign to it. Freedom brings out the 
real. tr.eaning of' trut~, and gives it a specific character 
by means o:f negation. Concerning truth Hegel writes: ttTb.is 
is truth, ~is condition of being adequate, of being object 
and subject. The f'act that it is itself the object makes 
it the reality, . the Notion, the Idea, and it is this which 
makes the Truth.n2 Concerning freedom he writes: 
So, too, it is the religion of' :freedom. Freedom· con-
sidered abstractly means that the mind is related 
to something objective Which is not regarded as foreign 
to its nature, its essential character is.the same as 
that o:f truth, only that in the case of freedom the 
negation o:t: tbe difference o:f Otherness bas been done 
away with and absorbed in something higher~ and thus 
it a)pe ars in the :form of Reconciliation. 11v 
Reconciliation starts f'rom the fact that there are different 
libid., II, 346. 
--. 
2±-bid., II, 346. 
-·. 
3Ibid .. , II, 346. 
forms of existence which stand to each other in a relation 
of opposition, namely, God, who has opposed to Him an 
estranged world. Reconciliation then, for Hegel, is the 
negation of this separation. It means that each recognize~ 
itself, find itself and its essential nature, in the other. 
This ~ofound truth finds its popular expression in the 
doctrine of tbe Incarnation-God has become man. The divine 
and human IlB. tures have become united. This notion of 
reconciliation plays an im~ortant }>art in Hegel 1 s specu-
lative t~e~a.tmant.~;of Christianity. It corresponds with 
the pt:>ocess v.hich Hegel calls •au:rgehoben" in the Logic 
in which the aspects of reality denominated thesis and 
' 
antithesis are taken up (aufgehoben) in a higher synthesis. 
The ]>articularity in each case is repudiated but nothing 
essential to the moment is lost. We shall have occasion 
to exhibit this pr-ocess of' reconciliation as it actually 
f'unctions in Hegelts view of Christianity. 
The final result of the whole of philosophy is that 
this Idea of the unity of the divine and human natures 
alone is the absolute truth. In its pure form it is the 
logical result, but it is likewise the result of a study 
of the concrete world. "What constitutes the truth, 1' 
Hegel writes, uis that Nature, life, Spirit, are thorougb1y 
organic, that each separate thing is merely the mirror of 
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this Idea, in sucb. a way that the Idea exhibit.s itself in 
it as in something isolated, as a.process in it, and thus 
it manifests this unity in itser:r.ul 
Christianity is the absolute relig.:kil because it has 
~ ~ ~· 
for its con tent the absolute truth. Philosophy is more 
adequate to expr-ess the absolute truth than is religion 
since philosophy alone exhibits the truth in the only form 
truJ.y adequate for its expression-the form of Thought. 
Christianity, however, expresses this identical content in 
the form of sensuous and pictorial thought which Hegel 
calls Vorstellung. 
On the level of religion Hegel finds the absolute truth 
revealed, in the. form of Vorstellu:ng, in the dogmas of' the 
Christian church. The Christian doctrines of the Trinity, 
the Creation, the Fall, the Incarnation, the Redemption, 
. 
the Resurrecti9n, and the Ascension exhibit in pictorial 
form the truths which it has been the task of Hegel's entire 
philosophy to set forth. It follows from this tb.at Hegel 
forthrightly rejects the attempts on the part of certain 
"rationalizing« theologians to meet the shallow demands of 
the understanding by watering down or explaining away these 
central doctrines of Christianity. 
According 1D the Hegelian system the final goal of 
libid., II, 347. 
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the universal process is the recognition of God as concrete 
spirit. This is also the :fundamental determination of 
Christianity. That which has been but :fragmentarily seen 
in earlier religions is at last completely unfolded. In 
accordance w.i th the moments of the Notion, concrete spirit 
is (1) the universal which suffers diremption into (2) the 
particular, which returns to identity with the universal 
in (3) the individual. 
The three :forms indicated are: eternal Being in and 
with itself, the form of Universality; the form of 
manifestation or appearance, that of Particularisation, 
Being :for another; the :fcrm o:f the return :from appearance 
into itself, absolute Singleness or individuality. 
The divine Idea unfolds its elf in these three 
forms. Spirit.is divine history, the process of self-
differentiation, o:f separation or diremption, and o:f 
the resumption of this; it is divine history, and this 
history is to be considered in each of these three forms.l 
In Christian Vorstellung the :first of these three :forms 
appears in the :form o:f God as He is in His own s el:f, before 
the creation of the world. The second movement is that the 
universal becomes t~e particular, i.e. God creates the world, 
nature, including man so f'ar as man is finite and a part of 
nature. And thirdly, th9 particular returns into the universal. 
This is according tD Hegel, the Church. Hegel deals with 
these three spheres, God as He is in Himself, the world, and 
-
the Church under the titles of the Kingdom of the Father, 
the Kingdom of the Son and the Kingdom of the Spirit. 
lHegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, III, 2. 
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B. Hegel's Speculative Treatment of Christianity. 
The religious mind, as we have already seen, inva~iably 
thinks in symbols, or as Hegel puts it, in the ~orm of Vorstel 
lUD8, and what is wrse, mixes up symbol with l:'eality. Hence 
when the understanding, which, for Hegel is the next higher 
stage o:t: thought, begins its task of corrosive analysis and 
criticism, exposing without ~ear or favor the manifest inad-
equacy of the symbol~ faith has called in aid, faith can make 
no convincing answer. At this unhappy juncture, when religion 
is about to be dismissed as an illusion once for all discredited 
in the forum of rational scrutiny, Hegel comes forward as its 
apologist. But he insists that effectual help can be given 
only if religion will consent to have its beliefs transposed, 
so· to say, into the key of' metaphysics. Give the symbols of 
the religious man a philosophical form, render them into 
speculative terms which will bear the tests of the higher 
reason, and all that has value may yet be saved from the 
wreck. Philosophy al.one, yet not alone, but as containing 
religion as transformed and related to aJ.l aspects of reality 
and e~erience, can pierce to the truth concerning God, and 
of mants relation to Him, by wh~ch is meant their unity in 
the Idea grasped by speculation. 
1. The Kingdom of the Father. 
Here Hegel is considering God as He is in Himself out-
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side of or before the creation of the world. At this first 
stage God exists in the abstract element of thought 1tand 
not in that of notional comprehension.nl It should be noted, 
however, that He never existed in fact in such abstraction. 
· God, as R~ is in Himself' before the creation of' the world is 
Universa1. As universal He is God the Father. It is the 
function of the universal to ~roduee the particular out of 
itself. In terms of Christian Vorste~lung this refers to 
God the Father who begets God the Son. The cycle is completed 
as the particular return~ to the universal as the individual, 
i.e. God the Holy Spirit. 
This metaphysical truth is pictorially exhibited in the 
Christian dogma of the Trinity. There is one God, yet three 
persons. Each of the J?lersons of the Trinity is not wo be re-
garded as a pa.rt of God, but as the entire Godhead.. To the 
mere understand~ng the Trinity remains f'orever a mystery and 
a contradi.ction. It comes up with its categories of finitude, 
counts one, tw:>, three, and says they cannot possibly be one. 
. .. 
Two persons, it is insisted, cannot be one person. And on 
the level of the understanding such an objection is quite 
right. The :finite understanding proceeds upon the principle 
of identity and therefore is never able to gras~ the truth 
in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Hegel regards his 
whole philosophy as setting forth in speculative terms the 
-l ~., III, 7. 
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truth. of the Trinity. Whoever has understood the Doctrine 
of the Notion as e:x:potmded in the Logic has understood the 
Trinity. The three stages o~ the Notion each express the 
entire Notion. The universal is not merely the universal; 
it is also the particular and the individual. The parti-
cular like"Wi se is tbe universal and the individual.. 
UHere we are not concerned to prove that the dogma, this 
silent mystery, is the eternal Truth. That is done, as has 
been aaid, in the whole of Philosophy.~l It should be 
remembered that it is precisely the character of the Notion 
that, on the one hand, it differentiates itsel~ into its 
factors, but on the other hand, in these distinctions it 
remains absolutely identical with itself, so that they in 
no wise interrupt or disturb its absolutely transparent 
unity and simple sel:f'-identity. Ul?-iversality is the original 
simple self-identi'!iY of the Notion. This is the factor of 
unity and identity. Particularity is the factor of difference, 
but although it is thus an opposite, it is identical with the 
universal. For inasmuch as the universal is now brought 
face to face with an opposite, the universal is now itself 
only one of two. It is therefore only a partic'Ula.r. Singular-
ity of the individl}-al is simply the identity of the universal 
and the p a!"ticu.lar. The universal., the particular, and the 
singular, are therefore com])lete1y identical with each other. 
libid., III, l3. 
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Each, therefore, is the other two just as much as it is 
itself. Hence each is the whole undivided notion. It 
.follows then that while for the finite understanding which 
operates on the principle of' identity the Trinity remains 
a perplexing mystery, _for those who accept Hegel's principle 
o:f speculative reason-the identity of' opposit~s-it be-
comes the very principle of rationality itself'. 
2. The Kingdom of' the Son. 
At this stage Hegel is showing how this Idea passes out 
of its condition of' universality and infinity into the de-
termination or specific form of' finitude. This eternal and 
logical development is pictorially represente~ in Christianity 
as an event--the creation of the world by God. 
In the dogma of' the creation God and the world are posited 
as o~posites; the latter is regarded as a product of' the .former. 
Thought, on the contrary, cannot allow that this opposition is 
valid; for if the infinite had the .finite outside itself 
it would be limited by it and would no longer be infinite. The 
truth which the dogma of creation contains is that the infinite 
does not exist in self-dependence and isolation, but always 
points beyond itself'; the essence of the .finite is its limitation, 
but precisely because of this limitation , of the negation as 
Hegel would put it, it hangs togethe:r with the whole content 
of existence, and is taken up into the infinite and determined 
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by it. Then too, Christianity regards the creation as an 
arbitrary act o:f God, but seen :from the side of speculative 
reason it becomes necessary to regard it as lying in the divine 
nature to create a mrld. This :follows :from the fact that it 
is a logical n~cessity that the Idea must come out of itself 
into otrerness. 
Eternal Being,· in-and-:for-itsel:f, ·is something which 
unfolds itself, determines itself, differentiates itself, 
posits itself as its own difference, but the difference, 
again, is at the same time eternally dona away with and 
absorbed; what bas essential Being,·Being in-and-for-itself, 
eternally returns to itself in this, and only in so far 
as it does this is it Spirit.l 
The world and especially man as a part of the world, is, 
in its othe ness, estranged from God. In Christian Vor-
stellung this e~trangement is presented in the doctrine of 
the Fall of man. The essence o:r ·the estrangment is found 
in man as a particular spirit regarded apart :from God, and 
universal spirit. To say that man is by nature evil .. is 
simply to say that man is particular for evil is particularity. 
Evil is first present within the sphere of knowledge; it 
is the consciousness of independent Being, or Being-for 
self relatively to an Other, but also relatively to an 
Object which is inherently universal in the sense that 
it is the Notion, or rational will. It is only by means 
of this separation that I exist independently, for myself, 
and it is in this that evil lies. To be evil means in an 
abstract sense to isolate myself; the isolation which 
separates me from the·Universal represents the element of 
rationality, the laws, the essential characteristics of 
Spirit.~ 
The truth contained in the figurative conception of the Fall 
is an eternal truth belonging to the very essence of the 
libid., III, 35. 
--. 
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Notion itselr, but as wax the case with creation, Christian 
dogma regards it as an event which happened. 
Hegel overcomes this estrangement metaphysically in his 
doctrine that the particular r~turns again into the universal 
in the moment of individuality. In a ver~ significant passage 
Hegel tells us: 
The possibility of reconciliation rests only on the conscious 
recognition of the implicit unity of divine and human nature; 
this is the necessary basis. Thus Man can know that he 
has been received into union with God in so· far as God is 
not for him something foreign to his nature, in so far as 
he does not stand related to God as an external accident, 
but when he has been taken up in to God in his essential 
character, in a way which is in accordance with his free-
dom and subjectivity; this~ however, is possible only in 
so far as this subjectivity which belongs to human nature 
exists in God Himself. 
This "implicit unity of divine and human natureft referred 
~ 
to above is exhibited, in its religious garb, in the Christian 
doctrines of the Incarnation of Christ, his death, resurrection 
and ascension. In the words of Scripture: 
Let this m:indbe in you,-whichwas also in Ghrist Jesus: Who, 
being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal 
with God: But made himself of no reputation, and took upon 
him the form of a servant, and was made- in the likeness of 
men: And being found in f'ashion as a man, he humbled himself'~ 
and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. 
Bod in s'!-bmitting to death proceeded to the very extreme o:r 
finitude. In Hegelts words: 
Now, hOwever~ a further determination comes into play--
God has died~ God is dead,-this is the most frightful 
of all thoughts, that all that is eternal, all that is 
true is not, that negation itself is found in God; the 
deepest sorrow, the :reeling of something completely 
irretrievable, the renunciatio% of everything of a higher 
kind, are connected with this. 
lrbid., III, 71. 
2Holy Bible, Phil. 2:5-8. 
3flegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, III, 91. 
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But, Hegel continues, the course of thought does not 
stop short here: fiGod, that is to say, maintains Himself in 
this process, and the latter is only the death of death. God 
1 
comes to life again, and thus things are reversed.• This is 
the meaning o:f the resurrection and the ascension o:f Christ. 
Like all that goes before, this elevation of Christ to heaven 
outwardly appears :for the immediate or natural consciousness 
as an event that happened at a particular time and place. Be-
fore His death Christ appeared to his disciples as an indi-
vidual under the limitations of sense; after his resurrection 
he stripped off all the limitations of finitude. 
This otherness and finitude which constituted the basis 
of' man's estrangement. are at last seen to be aspects of the 
very s~bstance o~ G()d• The estrangeme!l_.~ . is. o~~reome in that 
the So:a o:t God, once· dead, has ainee been raised :f'J?om the 
. . . . ·~ ,_ .. .. 
d~ad __ and h~s ~scande~. t<? .~he _Fatl:l.e~~ .o~ m.o~e abstr.actl.y, ~he 
universal. which bee &me particular now returns into itself. 
This·then is the explication of the meaning·of reconcilia-
tion, that God is reconciled with the world, or rather 
tbat God has shown Himself to be by His very nature 
reconciled with the world, that what is human is not 
something alien to His nature, but that this otherness, 
this self~dif:ferentiation, :finitude, as it is· sometimes 
expressed, is a moment in God Himself, though, to be sure, 
it is a vanishing moment; still He has-in this moment re-
vealed and shown Himself to the Church.2 
1Ibid .. , III, 91. 
2Ibid., III, 91. 
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3. The Kingdom of the Spirit. 
In the kingdom o£ the Spirit the reconciliation between 
man and God is expressed in terms o£ the Spirit of God dwelling 
in man. This accomplished reconciliation is the basis of' the 
Christian community. The Holy Spirit indwells the Church as 
the company of' believers. The Christian consciousness is being 
gradually guided and educated into all truth by the immanent 
Holy Spirit. In this way the £ormation of' dogma takes place.,-
uit is clear that the community produces this Faith. It is 
not merely the collocation of' the words of' the Bible, but the 
product of the Church •• It is the interpretation of' these words, 
and of' the merely external history of Christ by the Spirit, in 
the degree to which h~· is able to enlighten the Christian 
community. ttl 
The early Christians under the influence of' the Holy 
Spirit in interpreting the content of' the faith and in formu-
lating it into doc~rinal symbols made use of forms supplied 
by the previous development of philosophy. It was only 
gradually that it oould create out of' existing philosophical 
conceptions a philosophy adequate to its content. 
In the Nicene Council was ultimately established a 
fixed confession of faith to which we still adhere; 
this confession had not, indeed, a speculative form, 
but the profoundly speculative is most intimately inter-
woven with the manifestation of Christ himself. The 
profoundest thought is connected with the personality 
o£ Christ--with the historical and external. And it is 
libid., II, 328. 
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the very grandeur of the Christian religion that, ~th 
all this profundity, it is easy of comprehension in its 
outward aspect by our consciousness, while, at the same 
time, it summons us to penetrate deepe,r. It is thus 
adapted to every grade of culture, and~t satisfies the 
highest requirements.l -- -
In this section Regel reasserts the doctrine of the 
sacraments. The child is born into the fellowship of the 
chilrch through baptism. The sacrament of the Lord's Supper 
is, for Hegel, •the central point of Christian doctrine, and 
it is from it that all the differences in Christian doctrine 
get their colour and peculiar character.ft2 This represents the 
highest act of worship since it is in nthe Sacrament of the 
Supper, in which Man has given him in a sensible immediate way 
the consciousness of his reconciliation with God, the a-
biding and indwelling of the Spirit in him.~3 He briefly 
considers the three .wrincipal positions with regard to the 
Lord's Supper, the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation,. 
the Zwinglian recollection view and the Lutheran view. He 
--
accepts the Lutheran position because it emphasizes the fact 
that •it is only in spirit a:od in faith that we have the 
4 present God.u He continues: nThe sensible presence is in 
itself nothing, nor does consecration make the host into an 
object e.xixts in faith only, and thus it is in the consuming 
and destroying of the sensuous that we have union with God 
and the consciousness of this union of the subject with God.•5 
lHegel, The PhilosoEhY of Historz, p. 341. 
2Hegel, Lectures on the Philo so Eh:V of Religion, III, 132. 
3Ibid~, III, 132. 
4Ibid., III, 133. 
5Ibid., III, 147. 
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Throughout the whole stage of Absolute Religion we have 
haa the true content exhibited under the form of Vorstellung. 
For the religious consciousness this represents the highest 
form in which truth is manifested. Owing to the fact that 
.reflection has invaded the domain of religion, thought or 
reflection takes up a hostile attitude to the ordinary or 
popular idea in religion and to its concrete content. If 
religion takes refuge in emotion, renouncing the understand-
ing of its content, the Church has no longer a bond of community 
and collapses into sects. 
Religlon, the need felt by the pious mind, can take 
refuge·in 111 experience,ft in feeling, as well as in the 
Notion, and limit itself to this, and thus give up the 
search after truth, renounce the possibility of knowing 
any content, so· that the Holy Church has no longer any 
communion in it, but splits up into atoms. For what 
communion there is is in doctrine; but he~e each indi-
vidual has a feeling of his ow.n, has his own sensations · 
or exteriences, and his particular theory of the universe.l 
Philosophy enters at this point. At first sight it would 
appear as if it too stood opposed to the Church since it 
does not deep the forms of the popular idea but, rather, 
seeks to comprehend it in thought. This alleged opposition 
is in appearance only for it recognizes that the form of the 
popular idea, or as Hegel calls it, Vorstellung, ia also 
necessary. Philosophy points out that the Understanding is 
the most violent enemy of religion. But when philosophy 
exhibits the eaement of reason in the Christian religion, 
when it shows that the witness of the Spirit, of truth, is 
libid., III, 147. 
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~~~ed in religion, then religion stands justified at the 
~ . 
judgment bar of reason. Hegel writes: 
In philosophy, religion gets its justification from 
thinking consciousness. 
In faith tbe true content is certainly already found, 
but there is still wanting to it the form of thought. All 
forms·such as we have already dealt with, feeling, popular 
ideas, and such like, may certainly have the form of 
truth, but they themselves· are not the· true form which makes 
the true content necessary. Thought is the absolute judge before which the content must verify and 
attest its claims.l 
Hegel is not rejecting the importance of feeling in this 
final sectiono Philosophy structures feeling; it ~thinks what 
the subject feels.u2 The conflict between the claims of 
feeling and the criticism of the understanding is healed by 
philosophy. 
For us philosophical knowledge has harmonised this discord, 
and the aim of th~se lectures has just been to reconcile 
reason and religion, to show how we know this latter to 
be in all its manifold forms necessary, and to rediscover 
in revealed religion the truth and the Idea.3 
Hegel concludes his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
by observing that philosophy forms ffa sanctuary apart, and 
those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests, 
who must not mix with th~ world, and whose work is to protect 
the possessions of Truth.n4 
At this point we conclude our exposition of Hegelts ~hil­
osophy of' religioh. We should be reminded that the Hegelian 
libid~ ~ III, 148. 
2Ibid., III, 149. 
3Ibid~, III, 149. 
4 Ibid., III, ~50. 
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system does not stop with Religion but moves on to the stage of 
Philosophy in which, at last, we find the Idea expressed in a 
form adequate to its content, i.e., the form of Thought. 
In the next chapter, Chapter VII, the stage of Philosophy is 
briefly described in order to enable us to see the entire sphere of 
Absolute Mind as a whole--art, religion, and philosophy. 
CHAPTER VII 
TEE SPEERE OF PHILOSOPHY 
The Sphere of Absolute Spirit ends the Hegelian syst~m 
and Philosophy constitutes the final phase of this sphere. 
The ap;t:e arance of Absolute Spirit as a principle constitu-
ting on its own acco'Ullt a distinctive stage of experience 
is at once a demand of the preceding development and a con-
dition of making experience self-complete. Each of the two 
forms--art and religion--which we have considered and in 
which the Absolute is seen to appear, is circumscribed in 
its nature and process: hence the variety of religions is 
necessitated by and is. indirectly due to the failure of 
any one type and the inadeq~cy of every single type to re-
veal the Absolute completely. A form of appearance or 
self-manifestation of the Absolute is therefore demanded 
which will reveal Absolute Spi~it adequately to itself 
as it essentially is in itself. Here it will know itself, 
so to speak~ face to face~ and with perfect completeness. 
At last the Absolute is seen for what it essentially is, 
as thought, or more precisely, as the Idea. 
We are not to think tba t the human race had to wait for 
the appearance of philosophy to become aware of truth. Re-
ligion contains truth-under the form of imagination. "Thus 
• 
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Religion has a content in common with Philosophy, the forms 
alone being different.nl The difference between religion 
and philosophy is only that in religion the content is 
conceived in the form of imagination, so tba t what are fo l:' 
the philosopher ultimate relations, expressions of an 
eternal t:r-uth valid for all times, are regarded as historical 
events, a:J!ll.d are conceived in figurative form. 
Philosophy thinks and conceives of that which Re-
ligion represents as t:te object of consciousness, 
whether it is as the work of imagine. tion or as 
existent facts in history. The form of the knowledge of 
the object is, in religious consciousness, such as 
pertains to the ordinary idea, and is thus more or 
less sensuous in nature. In Philosophy we do not say 
that God begot a Son, which is a relation derived from 
natural life.2 
This· external, pictorial, historical form drops of'f' when 
philosophy translates the content of religion into the 
fo:rm of thought. 
Since mythology in its expression takes sensuous 
forms, much that is ~mntingen t and external becomes 
intermingled, for the representation of the Notion in 
sensuous forms always possesses a certain incongruity, 
seeing t hat what is .founded on ima~ina ti on cannot ex-
press tm Idea in its real aspect!\ .... Thought alone 
is the absolute fonn. of the Idea.'± 
Even philosophy, as the final stage of Absolute .l'IJ.ind, 
did not attain its CO!t!Plete fo nn in the first instance. 
Philosophy, too, has undergone an extensive development in 
which mthe absolute truth in the absolute form," finally 
.. 
is attained. 
1 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I, 79. 
2:cbid., I, 76. 
3:rbid., I, 82. 
4Ibid. ·' I, 83. 
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To this point the World-spirit bas come, and eaeh 
stage has its ow.n form in the true system of Phil-
osophy; nothing is lost~ all principles are preserved~ 
since Philosophy in its final aspect is the totality 
of forms. This concrete idea is the result of the 
strivings o:f spirit during almost twenty-five cen-
turies o:f earnest work to become objective to it-
self, to know itself: Ta:ntae molis erat, se ipsam. 
cognoscere mentem.l 
As we have seen in the stages of art and religion, the 
Notion in its complete form is not attained at once. Iso-
lated moments of it appear first. At the end of the pro-
cess Philosophy sees the Absolute as Idea. The whole 
development of spirit from its earliest stages has been 
motivated by this one impulse,-to bridge the gulf between 
subject and object, and this is now complete, and with this 
the development of spirit is complete. Hegel writes in the 
Logic: 
For these thousands of years the same Architect 
has directed the work: and that Architect is the one 
living Mind whose nat~e is to think, to bring to 
self-consciousness what it is, and, with its being 
thus raised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of 
its own being.2 
The·se are the words o:f Hegel as they appear in the Intro-
duction to his Logic at the very beginning of his system. The 
same conviction is expressed at the very end o:f the third volume 
of Hegelts Lectures on the History of Philosophy where he is 
discussing the flFinal Resultn of the development of the Ab-
1~., III, 546. 
~egel~ The Logic of Hegel, 22. 
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solute. 
This work of the spirit to know itself, this activity 
to find itselr, is the life of the spirit and the 
spirit itself. Its result is the Notion which it 
takes up of itself; the history of Philosophy is a 
revelation of what has been the aim of spirit through-
out its history; it is therefore the worldts history 
in its innermost signification.l 
Hegel enjoins. us not to esteem lightly what spirit 
has won, namely, its gains up to the present time. Ancient 
philosophy is to be regarded as necessary, and nas a link 
in thi~ sacred chain, but all the same nothing more than 
a link.u2 In two marvelous passages he gives us his view 
of the history of philosophy. Considered externally, 
the history of philosophy shows us na succession of noble 
.-
minds, a gallery of heroes of thought, who, by the power 
of Reason, have penetrated into the being of things, of 
- . 
nature and spirit, into the Being of God, and have won for 
us by their labours the highest treasure, the treasure of 
3 
reasoned knowledge.n Concerning the internal significance 
o:f the history of philosophy, Hegel insists that tlall the 
various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories o:f 
the time, or anything of a similar nature; they are neither 
chance products nor the blaze o:f a :fire o:f straw, nor casual 
eruptions here and there, but a spiritual, reasonable, 
l:Regel, Lectures on the History o:t Philosophy, III, 547. 
2Ibid., III, 547. 
3Ibid., I, 1. 
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forward advance; they are of nece-ssity one Philosophy in 
its development, the revelation of God, as He knows Himself 
to be.~l 
If we glance at the main epochs in the whole history 
of philosophy, and grasp the necessary succession of stages 
in the leading moments, each of which expresses a determinate 
Idea, we find that •after the Oriental whirl of subjectivity, 
which attains to no intelligibility and therefore to no 
subsistence,u the light of thought dawned first among the 
Greeks. In the Being of the Eleatics we see the Idea in 
its first manifestation. In the Universal o~ Plato, Hegel 
tells us, abstract thought became known to itself as uni-
versa! essence or existence, not as subjective thought. In 
Aristotle the Notion emerges, free and unconstrained, as 
comprehending thought, permeating and_spiritualizing all 
the forms which the universe containsw The Notion as sub-
ject, its independence, its inwardness, abstract separation, 
is represented by the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. 
Hegel informs us that it has been the work of modern 
times to grasp this Idea as spirit, as the Idea that knows 
itself. In order to proceed from the conscious Idea to the 
self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely, 
the fact that the Idea has come to the consciousness of 
libid., III, 547. 
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being absolutely sundered in twain. With Descartes pure 
thought directed itself on that separation. With Spinoza 
Thought and Being are opposed and yet identical; he has the 
intuitive perception of substance> but the knowledge of sub-
stance in his case is external. On the other hand, self-
consciousness thinks of itself as being self-consciousness 
we are told. In being self-conscious it is independent, but 
still in this independence it has a negative relation to 
what is outside self-consciousness. This is infinite sub-
jectivity, which appears at one time as the critique of 
thought in the case of Kant, and at another time, in the 
case of Fichte, as the tendency or impulse towards the con-
crete. 
In Hegel's own philosophy absolute reconciliation is 
achieved. Subject and object are now recognized as identical. 
This is then the demand of all time and of ~ilosophy. 
A new epoch has arisen in the world. It would appear 
as if the World-spirit had at last succeeded in stripping 
off from itself all alien objective existence, and appre-
hending itself at last as absolute Spirit, in develop-· 
ing from itself what for it is objective, and keeping · 
it within.its own power, yet remaining at rest all the 
while •••• This is the whole·history of' the world in 
general up to the present time, and the history of 
Philosophy in particular, the sole work of which is 
to depict this strife. Now, indeed, it seems to have 
reached its goal, when this absolute self-consciousness, 
which it·had the work of' representing, has ceased to 
be alien, and when spirit accordingly is realized as 
Spirit.l 
libid., III, 551. 
. ~ 
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According to Hegelian principles to arrive at the end 
of' the Hegelian system is to :find one's self at the beginni;g.g. 
T.his is what Hegel is referring to when he says that philosophy 
is a circle which returns into itself.1 Philosophy, for 
Hegel, comes at the end of the system. But to find out 
what philosophy is, is to begin again at the beginning$ 
i.e., with the Logic which treats of the Idea. Here at 
the end of the system we once again reach the Idea, this 
time actualized in the philosophic mind. ~In this 
manner,fl Hegel writes in the Logic, ttphilosophy exhibits 
the appearance of a circle which closes with itself, and 
has no beginning as the other sciences have. • • • This is 
in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy--
to arrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its 
return and its satisfaction.n2 The world-process has reached 
its consummation. The one single aim, the action and the 
. . 
goal of philosophy have, at length, been reached. It is at 
this point that Hegelian philosophy ends and no better place 
could be found to conclude this study. At last 11 the eternal 
Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself 
to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind (spirit).u3 
lHegel, The Logic of Hegel, 28. 
2~., 28. 
3Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, 536. 
-
·~· 
CHAPTER VIII 
HEGELtS PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A CRITIQUE 
In the preceding chapters we have attempted to set f'orth 
the basic principles of' Hegel's philosophy of' religion. The 
f'orm employed has. been expository and relatively f'ree f'rorn 
critical comment. Still,· one· should not be unmindf'ul of' the 
f'act that to s~t f'orth is to interpret and to expound is to 
evaluate to some extent at least. It remains for us to 
consider the positive insights_as well as the weaknesses of' 
'• 
Hegel~s philosophy of' religion. 
It will help, at the outset, to see Hegel in an historical 
· per.spective-as reacting against the theories of' art and 
religion brought to light by romanticism. For purpose~ of this 
study we will limit our attention to Hegel's rejection of the 
core of Friedrich Schleiermacherts philosophy of' religion. 
At the beginning of' his Logic Hegel indicates the 
) . 
fundamental characteristic of his conception of.art andre-
ligion: "If' it be correct to say that thought makes the dis-
tinction between man and the lower animals, then everything 
hUman is human, for the sol~ and simple reason that it is due 
1 to the operation of thought.fl With this statement Hegel 
lHegel, The Logic of Hegel, 4. 
.. 
'W' -~ . 
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forever ~uta himself in opposition to th~~e views peculiar 
to the religious thought of .romanticism-views which f'ind 
their cl~ss~c expression in the work of' Schleiermacher. Pro-
fessor H. R. Mackintosh writes: 
If we examine his words carefully, we find that Schleier-
macher--like Goethe, whose idea of piety much resembles 
his, and who in his own person represented the great back-
ground of' Romanticis~can put what religion means for him 
in all sorts of ways. An anthology of passages would dis-
play a striking variety of phrase. Thus, religion-consists 
in manta becoming conscious of' his own limitations, of' the 
fortuitous nature of' his lif'e as his being runs its course 
and silently disappears in the Infinite. It is his giving -
up all audacious·· pride, and regarding all individual- things, 
himself' included, as being necessarily what they are. Itis 
to live in the endless nature of the lhole, to perceive and 
divine with quiet reverence the place assigned therein to 
each and all. It is to have sense and taste for the In-
finite, to lie on the bosom of' the Universe and f'eel its 
boundless lif'e and creative power pulsingwithin our own. 
+t is to drink in the beauty of the world and be drenched 
through and through with its spirit. It is devoutly to _ 
overhear the All in its expressions and acts, to let one-
self' be swept away by its influence as we con·template the 
wonders of its workings, to discover and love the Spirit 
pervading the cosmic whole.l 
Schleiermacher had insisted that religion is not science; 
it is not morality; its seat is not in reason, or conscience, 
or will. Since religion is the direct touch of the soul with 
the Divine, its home can be nowhere but in feeling. Here we 
must be careful not to misunderstand him. He is not concerned 
at this point with the way convictions, hopes, and norms have 
persisted throughout the various f'orms of human worship in the 
past, but rather to discover the special psychical function 
_ lHugh Ross~ Mackintosh; Ttpes·o:r Modern Theolog:y: (:New~:x()_~k: 
:.q-;..::.~scri?:>nex-Js.:. ~oil's,';;: 1937), p. 45. 
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in man which is concerned wherever and whenever man comes to 
be in the religious attitude~ 
There has been considerable disagreement among theologians 
as to how Schleiermacherts famous definition of religion a~ 
••the feeling of absolute dependencett should be interpreted. 
If we accept the obvious meaning which appears to lie on the 
surface then he would indeed fall heir to the criticism of 
psychological subjectivism of which so many critics have 
accused him. It seems more likely that he intended us to regard 
Dfeeling8 as a mode of objective apprehension~ a species of 
emotional perc~ption or awareness of spiritual things and 
especially God. 
To find the solution for this particular problem of 
interpretation~ however, is not our concern. What immediately 
appears is the vehemence with which Hegel would reject this view. 
The reason for this is not hard to see. It lies in Hegel's 
conviction of the truth of the passage quoted above from the 
Logic. For Hegel it is thought which sets man off from the 
beast. Hegel is not condemning feeling outright as something 
which is subhuman; but he maintains that the romantics we·re 
wrong in believing that the presence of thought in religion 
. . 
must of necessity destroy religious feeling, and still more 
in considering religious feeling as the opposite of thought. 
According to Hegel, it is because man thinks that he 
alone possesses law, religion, and morality. Feeling is 
particular, contingent, and private; it is the purely subjective, 
the arbitrary, the accid~ntal. The religious relation of man 
to God is one of thought. God himself is not to be grasped by 
this lowest of the spiritual forms, but only by thought and as 
thought. Strictly speaking, for Hegel thought is_the sole 
mode of apprehending the eternal and the absolute. Yet it is 
a thought which includes and is made rich by feeling. 
The romantics were revolting against discursive, analytic 
thought as the vehicle of the synthetic life of the spirit. 
Hegel, who is in part at least a romantic, also rejects this. 
This is the level of the "mere understanding" as Hegel calls 
it and on this level it is impossible to adequately apprehend 
the life of the spirit. In order to escape the rational con-
ceptions of religion which were so distast.eful to them, the 
romantic thinkers fell into the opposi t·e extreme, that is, 
in order to gain more religion they stripped it of any 
objective and historical character. Hegel made an important 
contribution to religious thought by pointing out that the 
romantic theory o:r religion is, at best, a half truth. Be-
cause they feared the destructiveness of thought, the ro-
mantics shunned its discursiveness, and this led them to 
prefer what is implicit, indefinite, .. and unorganized to what 
. . 
is explicit, definite, and organized. 
Some may charge Hegel with avoiding the pitfalls of ro-
mantic subjectivism only to fall into the opposite error. 
' 
I 
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There are a great many thinkers, especially in our day, who 
would steadf'astly reject Hegelts rationalism and insist that 
there are other dimensions to life besides thought. To so 
object, however, is to misunderstand Hegelrs position. Hegel 
does not, as we have seen, reject feeling outright. His 
argument is that what has its roots only in my feeling exists 
only for me; it is mine, but it has no independent existence 
of its own. The object of his attack was the theory which 
not only identified feeling and immediate experience of the 
presence of God as characteristic of religion, but went so far 
as to consider them the only method by which knowledge of such 
an object can be attained. 
This Hegel could not accept. Nevertheless, feeling is a 
valid mode of apprehension but only so far as it is informed 
by thought. Feeling alone is particular whereas. thought 
raises it to the level of universality, or rather, the presence 
of thought is the ~lement of universality and hence objectivity. 
Hegel performed a very .significant service to the philosophy of 
religion in his analysis of feeling as a mode of apprehension. 
Closely connected with this is Hegel1 s whole treatment of 
the forms of religious consciousness. During Hegelrs time the 
question was everywhere being asked "To what specific faculty 
of human consciousness does religion belong?m Is religion 
essentially a matter of feeling, knowledge or volition? Hegel 
is to be commended in his recognition that to put the question 
l56o 
in this way is to proceed on the basis of a faulty psychology. 
To divide the consciousness of man into separate and dis-
tinct powers or faculties which somehow come together with 
the flmindn as their substratum is to misrepresent the facts 
of our experience Hegel insisted. He would admit that 
while calling attention to the various ways consciousness 
manifests itself, i.e., rationally, emotionally, volitionally 
et cetera, is to perform a helpful task, it in no way repre-
sents the function of consciousness as it really is. Hegel 
was ahead of his time in recognizing that consciousness must 
be thought of as a spiritual unity of Which the various elements 
necessarily involve one another and which are the correlative 
expressions of a common principle and this common principle is 
thought. Hegel was convinced that thought, intelligence, self-
consciousness, is not one among many coordinate faculties, 
having its own peculiar functions, its own particular times 
and ways of action, but rather it is that which runs through, 
characterizes, gives organic relation to, all our spiritual 
activities. 
One of the lively areas in the thinking of many phil-
osophers of religion today concerns the nature of religious 
discourse. Hegelrs position with regard to this important 
problem can be easily deduced from his central teaching that 
religion manifests itself in the form of_V?rstellung. The 
language of religion is semi-sensuous, i.e., it rises to the 
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level of the purely sensuous but not so far as to reach 
the level of speculative thought where all association with 
the sensuous is forever severed. The language of religious 
discourse finds itself to be 1'in a state of constant unrest 
between immediate sensuous perception, on the one hand, and 
thought proper on the other.ul Hegelts position can be 
easily illustrated by turning to specific examples. When we 
speak of the Father and the Son in the Trinity we do not mean 
to affirm that the relationship is the same as the relation 
of a human father and son. The terms uson" or flbegotte~u 
Hegel tells us, are 
only a figure derived from a natural relation, 
regarding which we know quite well that it is not 
intended to be understood in its immediate sense, 
but that what is indicated is rather a relation 
which is only approximately the one here described, 
and that this sensuous relation has in it what 
corresponds moat nearly to the relation which is 
taken in the strict sense in regard to God2 
This view that religious language is to be taken symbolically 
and not lite~ally is very much in favor today. One has only 
to read W. T. Stace r s Time and Ete.!'nit:y, -~.U~.ar_i~~::.Lan:ger t s 
....... . 
Philosophy in a New Ke:y:, and Urban's Language and Reality to 
mention only a few who have a vltew of the nature of religious 
discourse which is strikingly similar to Hegel's. 
1 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, 145. 
2Ibid., I, 145. 
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Hegel had another reason to prove that thought was present 
in religion besides the de.sire to ref'ute certain theories of' 
romanticism. He wanted, in addition, to prove that philosophy 
was not destructive of' reli~ion. Their content is the same; 
the f'orm alone is different. The,question of whether art and 
religion are not ultimately lost in philosophy is a real 
question. 
There seems to be a tension which runs through Hegel's 
whole thought which might be raised as an issue to be con-
sidered. On the one hand, Hegel firmly holds that art and 
religion are essential forms of the human spirit. On the other 
hand, the central conception of his whole system, joining with, 
or r~har determined by his controversial attitude towards 
romanticism, seems to lead him to regard them as inferior 
f'orms of' philosophy. Although this would not appear to be 
his definite aim, he does, in effect, turn his back upon 
these two forms of spiritual life and either merges them in 
philosophy or else makes them act as its handmaids. 
That this tendency is present cannot be denied but it 
is only fair to recognize another side to it. What he is 
objecting to is taking art and religionsas sufficient in 
th.emselves. On his view they die in their isolation and 
particularity to rise again in complementation in the whole. 
Still one may ask VAt least for the philosopher does not 
philosophy ultimately replace religion?• It would seem so 
on Hegel's view. 
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This is closely akin to what many would feel to be a 
major objection to Hegel. Philosophers, it is urged, should 
not first devise· a theory of religion, education or politics 
deducing it from a systematic conception of life as a whole, 
and then turn around to examine experience and see if it 
fits in with the theory. It is experience that must first 
state the problem, and the philosopher will then find in the 
statement itself all the elements of his future theory. He 
can either arrange these data in the light of a central system, 
or from consideration of them come to the conception of a 
central system. In either case the experience must suggest 
the theory and the experience must be taken as the final 
standard against which the theory is measured. 
That Hegel is guilty of first devising a theory and 
then _fitting the facts to it would be hard to prove. What-
ever else may be said c?ncerning this, one thing is sure, 
Hegel never intended to. In the Phenomenology of Mind he 
constantly starts with and returns to experience. His pro-
cedure is to (1) start with the prima facie or nimmediate• 
relation of the terms opposed as subject and object, then (2) 
proceed to show bow they mutually involve and determine or 
11mediatefl one another,. and thereby {3) evolve the inner unity 
of principle which both establishes and contains their immediate 
relation, and makes possible and necessary their mediation. 
"' 
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This criticism does not really make contact with Regel 
since it was his express intent to start with experience and 
let the facts determine the theory. Still, it is probably 
true that in his speculative zeal Hegel is sometimes carried 
away. In reading the great mass of empirical data concerning 
the definite religions which Hegel marshals so neatly in 
support of his view one can get the impression that at 
times the facts are stretched to fit the outline. Whether 
. this latter is true or not does not impugn ~y genuine insight 
which Regel may have attained along the way. 
And now what can be said regarding the change which the 
doctrines of Christianity undergo at his hands as they take 
on the form of speculative thought? It seems evident that 
in his speculative zeal Hegel overlooked the fact that is 
often missed by certain other contemporary philosophers of 
religion including those who have already been mentioned, namely, 
that to the believer in revelation the whole point is that 
dogma is more than a figure. Every positive religion ~ust 
assume that, at certain points, the difference between symbol 
and reality disappears--it would seem that this condition is 
essential if the concept of revelation is to possess any 
validity at all. Hegel disregards the fact that a change 
of form may very possibly denote an opposition in principle. 
The change of form which Hegel represents as quite harmless, 
effects, as a matter of fact, a trans~tion from a dualistic 
to a monistic conception of the world. 
• 
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Just as the middle part of Hegelts philosophic system, the 
philosophy of nature, is generally regarded as the least sig-
nificant part of his system, in like manner we can safely 
conclude that the middle part of his philosophy of religion, 
the part entitled Definite Religion where he deals with the 
non-Christian religions is the least significant part. The 
reasons for this are not entirely Hegel's. The science of 
comparative religions was just beginning in his day:,. indeed, 
he did much to stimulate its development. While he was in 
possession of an immense amount of empirical data concerning 
the religions which l:;l.e wrote about, it is only reasonable to 
recognize that more recent discoveries in this field were 
bound to make a difference • 
There is at least one criticism concerning this part of 
his philosophy of religion which could be made and one 
commendation. The criticism concerns the peculiar fact that 
Hegel, for some strange reason, had no place in his scheme 
for the Mohammedan religion. This is strange since he did 
discuss Judaism in some detail and Christianitt~s growth 
out of it. But there is no mention of Mohammedanism as a 
positive religion. There is no hint given anywhere why he 
omitted this important religion and no basis for conjecture 
as to the reason. 
Hegel is to be commended for his recognition that the 
religious ideas of bygone times and even of Christianity 
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itself, can only retain their value if we are able to discover 
that in one way or another they express our own experiences and 
our own thought. In this recognition he laid the foundation for 
the later development of the study of comparative religions. 
There is yet one more point. in .Hegel T s philosophy of reli-
gion which shou1~ be considered briefly. This point concerns 
what was meant to be construed as the crowning example of 
Hegel's s~gestive principle of identity as mediated through 
difference. Man, for him, is finite spirit; as such, however, 
he is ultimately identical with infinite Spirit. Hegel goes 
on to stress that it is in the development of the finite mind 
that the Infinite and Absolute, or God, first rises to con-
sciousness of self. •God," .Hegel writes in wards as plain as 
' 
any, 11is God only in so far as He knows Himself; His self-
knowledge is .His self-consciousness in man, is the knowledge 
man has of God, which advances to mants self-knowledge in God.ul 
Thus, it would appear, the Absolute has reality only in the 
thought of those who believe in Him. And history is now seen 
to be God's realization of Himself through, or in, the process 
of human experience. 
Now we must recognize that the idea that opposites are 
really moments or constituents in a living process of thought, 
that negation, followed by deeper affirmation, sounds the 
keynote of all development, is the outcome of a profound analysis 
of the mindts logical advance to the possession of truth. But, 
and this is the point of the criticism, the principle surely is 
l.Hegel, The Philosophy of Mind, 343. 
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misused when, as later by Hegel, it is applied not merely to 
human attitudes or partial apprehensions, but to distinct 
orders of reality, and even to the being of God Himself. 
What shall be our final estimate of Hegel's philosophy 
of religion? It is probably safe to say that there would 
be few if any who would today accept Hegelfs religious 
philosophy~ toto. This is partly du~ no doub~ to the 
fact that Hegel's particular formulation of his philosophy 
of religion is integrally bound up with the structure of 
his whole system. It would be hard to reject Hegel's general 
scheme and hold on to his philosophy of religion as a whole. 
Most people would probably find in Hegel's philosophy of 
religion today not a complete system which they could adopt 
as their own but rather a series of brilliant insights into 
the nature of. and towards the solution o:r certain important . 
problems. Regel remains, then, another guidepost along the 
way to truth but he is not to be identified with the desti-
nation itself. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis has as its primary purpose the exposition 
o~ Hegel's philosophy o~ religion as set forth in the three-
volume work entitled Lectures on the Philosophy o~ Religion. 
A secondary purpose of this thesis is to place Hegel 1 s re-
~le ctions on religion in their proper place within his total 
system, with special attentian to the particular sphere in 
which religion appears-the sphere of Absolute Mind .. 
Hegel's entire philosophical system is an explication 
o~ the Notion or the Idea. In Art which constitutes the 
first stage o~ Absolute Mind the Idea is sensuously clothed. 
The Idea is presented in its immediacy in Art. In Religion, 
the second or middle stage of Absolute Mind, the Idea is 
manifested in terms of Vorstellung which is variously translated 
.as picture thought or ordinary thought. The Idea is here 
ma:ni~ested in its otherness. In Philosophy.., the third and 
final stage of Absolute Mind, the Idea is at last manifested 
in a fbrm adequate to its content, i.e., the form o~ thought. 
Hegel rejects feeling and sensuous intuition as the locus 
of religion in mn in ~avor of thought by which he meant not 
one among many coordinate faculties, but rather that which 
runs through, charaaterizes, gives organic relation to.., all 
our spiritual activities. 
Hegel proceeds to a consideration of the various 
positive (pre-Christian) religions. BiS.~.:.nethod in the 
I 
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study of these religions involves two steps, namely (1) 
an attempt to comprehend the Idea of religion and its necessity 
and ( 2) an a xamination and interpretation of the mass of 
information gathered by empirical and historical methods in 
the light of this self-differentiating Idea~ 
Christianity is the Absolute religion. In the languat?;e 
of Vorstellung the dogmas of the Christian Church express 
the very same truths which philosophy propounds. The content 
is the same; the form alone is different. Religion is vindi-
cated· for the thinking men by allowing its symbols to be 
translated into the larguage which alone is adequate to their 
expression- the language ·of pure thought~ 
Hegel r s developmental treatment o.f the various historic 
religions prepared the way for the science of comparative 
religions. Hegel performed a significant service to philo.sophy 
of religion by his m alysis of tb. e nature and validity of 
the various forms which religion takes in the human con-
sciousness. His emphasis upon the symbolic character of 
raligious Cb ctrine and therefore of religious discourse is 
sympathetic with much contemporary thinking con earning this 
imp or tan t pr-oblem. 
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